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The Art of Line Drawing: 
The Establishment Clause and Public Aid to 
Religiously Affiliated Child Care 
ELIZABETH J. SAMUELS· 
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be 
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches 
excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that 
religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the 
institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and 
entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. I 
We are as Tocqueville described us 150 years ago: "There is no country in 
the whole world in which the Christian religion retains a greater influence 
over the souls of men than in America."2 
INTRODUCTION 
As the subject of child care has attained prominence on national, state, and 
local political agendas, the often tortured and uncertain legal discourse on the 
Establishment Clause has entered a new and difficult area, one that could lead 
to a profound alteration in the law governing public aid to religious 
institutions. A new federal program, the Child Care and Development Block 
Grant ("CCDBG"),3 for the first time provides lower-income families with 
federal child care aid that is not linked to welfare or other social services. The 
program includes a provision for vouchers4 that may be redeemed by parents 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago 
School of Law, 1980; AB., Harvard College, 1975. I would like to thank the University of Baltimore 
Educational Foundation, which provided a summer research grant; the University of Baltimore Law 
Library, for its superb services; Leonard G. Kotz, for research assistance; Steven P. Grossman, Charles 
B. Shafer, Wendy G. !\haller, and Sharon E. Rush for their comments and encouragement; and my 
husband Ira A. Bumim, who as Legal Director of the' Children's Defense Fund, lobbied briefly for an 
earlier version of the statute analyzed in this Article. Although he kindly discussed those activities with 
me, the views expressed in the Article are mine alone and not those of any other person or organization. 
l. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
2. Richard Harwood, Religious Evasion, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1990, at K6 (quoting from 1 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 303 (Phillips Bradley ed. & Henry Reeve trans., 
Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1848), in an editorial piece discussing, inter alia, Gallup poll data on 
Americans' beliefs such as the estimates that "94 percent believe in God or a universal spirit" and "84 
percent believe God answers prayers''). 
3.42 U.S.C. § 9858-9858p (Supp. m 1991). 
4. States are required to offer parents a choice between enrolling children ''with a child care 
provider that has a grant or contract for the provision" of services, id. § 9858c(c)(2)(A)(i)(I), or of 
receiving a child care certificate, id. § 9858c(c)(2)(A)(i). 
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for sectarian child cares and provisions for financial aid that may be paid 
directly to religiously affiliated but nonsectarian child care programs. 6 
In the process of enacting this legislation, Congress considered the 
circumstances under which public aid to religiously affiliated child care' 
services is constitutionally permissible. Although hundreds of millions of f'l 
federal dollars had already been, and continue to be, available to the states for 
funding private child care services through welfare-related programs7 and 
social services block grants,8 this constitutional issue had not been addressed 
5. The statute's definition of "child care certificates" states, "Nothing in this subchapter shall 
preclude the use of such certificates for sectarian child care services if freely chosen by the parent" Id. 
§ 9858n(2). 
6. The statute's definition of child care programs that may receive aid includes religiously affiliated 
providers. "Eligible child care provider" under the statute includes all center-based providers that are 
"licensed, regulated, or registered under State law as described in section 9858c(c)(2)(E)." Id. § 
9858n(5)(A)(i). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Child Care and Development Block 
Grant regulations define a center-based child care provider as "a provider licensed or otherwise 
authorized to provide child care services for fewer than 24 hours per day per child in a non-residential 
setting, unless care in excess of24 hours is due to the nature of the parent(s)' work." 45 C.F.R. § 98.2(i) 
(1992). 
The restriction on direct funding of sectarian child care services is found in 42 U.S.C. § 9858k(a), 
which provides that no financial assistance through any grant or contract under the state plan may be 
used for a sectarian purpose or activity. Infra notes 65, 92, 97-111 and accompanying text. 
The reader should be aware of the ways in which the terms "religiously affiliated" and "sectarian" 
are used in this Article to characterize child care programs. "Religiously affiliated" programs include 
all programs that have any type of relationship with a religious organization. The wide range of existing 
relations is discussed in part III. "Sectarian" programs include the subset of religiously affiliated 
programs that actually have religious purposes and engage in religious activities. See infra notes 26-27 
and 103 and accompanying text. 
7. Federal funds support child care through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
("AFDC'') program, which is administered by the states and funded jointly by the states and the federal 
government. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-697 (1988). In the 1950's one of the purposes of the program was to 
allow women to stay at home with young children. Now, with the Family Support Act passed in 1988, 
the program requires women with young children to work or to be in an education or training program. 
WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN?: CHILD CARE POLICY FOR TIlE 1990s (Cheryl D. Hayes et aI. 
eds., 1990) [hereinafter AMERICA'S CHILDREN] (study by the Panel on Child Care of the National 
Research Council). The program subsidizes related child care for a limited period of time, in addition 
to providing child care aid for a limited period to families who are leaving the AFDC program. 42 
U.S.C. § 602(G). See AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra at 212-13; 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603, 1302. For fiscal 
year 1992, Congress appropriated $340 million for child care aid under the Family Support Act 
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, THE NATION'S INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S FY 1993 BUDGET PROPOSALS i (1992) [hereinafter THE NATION'S INVESTMENT]. 
Another important source of welfare-related federal spending on child care is the new non-AFDC "At 
Risk" Child Care program that subsidizes child care costs for families at risk of becoming eligible for 
AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 602(i) (Supp. III 1991). For fiscal year 1992, Congress appropriated $383.8 million 
for this program, THE NATION'S INVESTMENT, supra, at i, which was passed in 1990 as Title IV-A Child 
Care Amendments. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-233 (1990). 
Other, much smaller welfare-related federal child care subsidies include AFDC provisions that allow 
parents to deduct some child care expenses when calculating benefits and programs that provide 
nutritious meals to children from low-income families who attend child care centers and family day care 
homes, AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra at 205, 215-16 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(iii) and id. §§ 
1751-1769, 1771-1789 (1988». , 
8. The Social Services Block Grant ("SSBG'') program (Title XX of the Social Security Act) 
provides funds to the states for social services programs for low-income and troubled families, including 
child protective services, foster care, and child care. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a (1988). A recent child care 
study, averaging figures developed in several earlier studies, estimated that in one year in the late 
1980's, $591 million out of some $2.7 billion was expended for child care services. AMERICA'S 
CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 214-15. For additional data and estimates, see THE NATION'S INVESTMENT, 
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at the federal level by either the legislative or the executive branch. 
Previously enacted programs had included neither statutory nor federal 
regulatory restrictions on aid to religiously affiliated child care. 
The CCDBG establishes a number of state-administered forms of aid for all 
types of public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit child c,are 
providers, including religiously affiliated ones.9 Unlike the earlier programs 
that included child care aid, this program expressly prohibits using any 
financial assistance that is paid to a provider under a grant or contract with 
a state "for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or 
instruction[.]" 10 The CCDBG, in addition, imposes certain nondiscrimination 
requirements with respect to grant and contract recipients' use of religious 
preferences in admitting children and employing staff. 11 Finally, the program 
requires states to allow eligible families to choose between (1) sending 
children to providers that receive payments from the state under a grant or 
contract and (2) receiving vouchers, called "child care certificates,"12 which 
supra note 7, at i; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, at 44 (1991) 
[hereinafter THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991]; H.R. REp. No. 985, loath Cong., 2d Sess. 5 
(1988); and CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET 210 (1987). 
Some additional child care is provided incidentally through the federally funded Head Start program, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9855g (Supp. III 1991), which provides health and social services as well as 
preschool educational services for poor children and their families. Head Start was not established to 
provide child care, and most sites operate only during the school year and only for part of the day. 
However, about 20% oflocal sites operate full day. THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, supra, 
at 45; AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 167. The Head Start Appropriation for fiscal year 1992 
was $2.2 billion. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1992, at 18 (1992) 
[hereinafter THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1992]. 
9. See supra note 6. 
In addition to center-based providers, the statutory scheme also includes group home child care, 
family child care, and other child care provided for compensation-if services of these three types are 
licensed, regulated, or registered under state law and satisfy state and local requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 
9858n(5)(A). Federal regulations define a "group home child care provider" as "two or more individuals 
who provide child care services for fewer than 24 hours per day per child, in a private residence other 
than the child's residence, unless care in excess of24 hours is due to the nature of the parent(s)' work." 
45 C.F.R. § 98.2(t) (1992). The statute defines a "family child care provider" as "one individual who 
provides child care services for fewer than 24 hours per day, as the sole caregiver, and in a private 
residence," 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(6); the federal regulations add the qualification that this care must be "in 
a private residence other than the child's residence," 45 C.F.R. § 98.2(r) (1992). (These definitions 
exclude care given in a child's home by a person employed by the child's family.) 
Finally, the statute also makes aid available to certain adult relatives who provide child care. An 
eligible child care provider includes, "a child care provider that is 18 years of age or older who provides 
child care services only to eligible children who are, by affinity or consanguinity, or by court decree, 
the grandchild, niece, or nephew of such provider, if such provider is registered and complies with any 
State requirements that govern child care provided by the relative involved." 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(5)(B). 
Group home care, family child care, and care provided by relatives are never religiously affiliated 
care because such child care programs never have any type of formal relationship with a religious 
organization. Aid to these types of providers, therefore, does not raise the Establishment Clause issues 
addressed in this Article. Free Exercise concerns, however, may be implicated by the statute's limitations 
on these child care providers' use of funds for religious purposes and activities and on their religious 
discrimination in the selection of children. See infra text accompanying notes 10-11,64-66,73-74,92, 
101 for descriptions of those limitations. (The statute does, however, exempt family child care providers 
from the restriction on religious discrimination in admissions. 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(2)(A).) 
10.42 U.S.C. § 9858k(a). 
11. [d. § 98581(2)-(4); see infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text. 
12. See supra note 4. 
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can be redeemed for sectarian child care services. 13 This Article examines 
the constitutionality of these provisions. 
The CCDBG's church-and-state-related provisions represent a legislative 
effort to perform the type of Establishment Clause line drawing that the 
Supreme Court has traditionally undertaken and continues to undertake in 
cases involving aid to religious institutions. The congressional debate and the 
public controversy it engendered over line drawing between permissible and 
impermissible aid to religiously affiliated child care, and the resolution 
reached in the CCDBG, all achieve an important constitutional aim. They 
reflect and reinforce a public ideal expressed in the Court's existing 
jurisprudence, the ideal that religious liberty is safeguarded by the separation 
of the public sphere of government and the private sphere of religion. 14 
Critics who would reformulate this jurisprudence argue with some force that 
the lines drawn in past Supreme Court decisions between permissible and 
impermissible aid are vague and unpredictable. IS The Court itself is 
periodically apologetic for a lack of coherence and clarity in its aid-to-
religious-institutions cases.16 Its doctrinal difficulties are illustrated in the 
well-known pair of rulings that permit aid for bus transportation to and from 
parochial schools, yet forbid aid for transportation for field tripS.17 But, 
however imprecise the exercise, and wherever the line is drawn, the very act 
of drawing a line, of determining when aid is permissible, upholds the 
Establishment Clause ideal. 18 
The enactment of the CCDBG demonstrates that the line-drawing exercise 
is a feasible and useful task. With the statute's grant and contract aid 
provisions, Congress has constructed a scheme that allows substantial aid to 
religiously affiliated child care while drawing a workable line between 
13. See supra note 5. 
14. For a recent example of this from a somewhat unexpected source, see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. 
Ct. 2649 (1992). Although he has appeared to define the Establishment Clause's prohibitions more 
narrowly, Justice Kennedy ~ote: 
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression 
are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State. The design of the 
Constitution is that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a 
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom 
to pursue that mission. It must not be forgotten then, that while concern must be given to 
define the protection granted to an objector or a dissenting non-believer, these same Clauses 
exist to protect religion from government interference. 
Id. at 2656-57. 
As religion clauses scholar Professor Douglas Laycock wrote, "It is too often forgotten that the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause both protect religious liberty. They both protect 
religious believers as well as nonbelievers." Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: 
Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 37, 68 (1991). 
15. See infra notes 192-93,314 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
17. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see 
infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
18. Cf. William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and establish-
ment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986). Professor Marshall describes the essence of Establishment Clause 
issues as "a conflict over symbols and not actual effects." Id. at 550. He argues that "a symbolic 
understanding of establishment may appropriately provide a cohesive framework under which 
establishment jurisprudence may be remodeled." Id. at 498. 
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prohibited aid that advances religion and permissible aid that does not. This 
Article argues that under existing Establishment Clause doctrines, the CCDBG 
measures allowing financial assistance to be paid by states to religiously 
affiliated nonsectarian child care programs are constitutional, whereas the 
requirement that the program's vouchers be redeemable for sectarian services 
is probably not constitutional. The Court, however, may modify and develop 
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence in ways that will allow the use of 
vouchers for religious programs. 19 This Article maintains that such action by 
the Court would undermine the traditional Establishment Clause ideal of 
separation between church and state. 
The questions addressed in this Article regarding the CCDBG's church-and-
state provisions are urgent ones. Federal and state agencies now implementing 
the CCDBG must analyze the statute in light of current Establishment Clause 
mandates, just as Congress struggled to do in the process of its enactment. 20 
State and federal courts will have to do the same in any challenges to the 
statute. Furthermore, even if federal constitutional doctrines are reworked and 
relaxed, state courts will have to decide whether to follow or to depart from 
federal Establishment Clause doctrines when interpreting the religion clauses 
of their own constitutions. For example, state courts may find their states' 
voluntary participation in the CCDBG, or their states' own child care 
assistance schemes, violative of state constitutional provisions regarding 
religion, even if they are permissible under the Establishment Clause.21 
Part I of this Article describes briefly the child care system that Congress 
undertook to support and expand by enacting the CCDBG. Part II describes 
the central features ofthe CCDBG and its church-and-state-related provisions. 
Finally, Part III analyzes both the meaning and the constitutionality of the 
church-state provisions in light of the Supreme Court's existing Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. 
1. THE CHILD CARE SYSTEM 
The current national child care landscape is a varied one that has a small 
public sector and is dominated by a large private one.22 A major portion of 
19. See, e.g., infra notes 274-312 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 63, 69-72, 107 and accompanying text. 
21. The State of Washington in 1989 illustrated how a state court may rely on state constitutional 
provisions to depart from the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Witters v. 
Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), the Supreme Court approved under the 
Establishment Clause an isolated instance of vocational rehabilitation payments requested for a blind 
man to study for the ministry at a private Christian College. On remand, the Washington Supreme Court 
rejected the payments on state constitutional grounds. Witters v. Washington Comm'n for the Blind, 771 
P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989). The Supreme Court of Washington determined that the payments would violate 
the state constitutional prohibition on using public money for religious instruction. [d. at 1120. "[Olur 
state constitution prohibits the taxpayers from being put in the position of paying for the religious 
instruction of aspirants to the clergy with whose religious views they may disagree." [d. 
22. A very small percentage of child care services are publicly sponsored. Publicly run child care 
services, of course, are center-based services. As the following data shows, fewer than half of children 
in care attend any sort of center-based program. Of the children who spend substantial time in child care 
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child care services are provided either (1) through family child care, which 
is child care offered for a small number of children in the provider's private 
home; (2) by relatives, in the child's home or the relative's home; or (3) in 
the child's home by an individual employed by the child's family.23 These 
types of private care account for more than half of all child care services used 
by families.24 Among center-based programs, which account for less than 
half of all child care services used by families,25 a distinct minority are 
sponsored by religious organizations.26 And among those centers sponsored 
(at least 20 hours per week for children younger than age five and at least five hours per week for 
children of ages five through twelve), recent national studies estimate that the following percentages of 
children use center-based care for more hours per week than they use other types of programs: 33% of 
children younger than three, 54% of children aged three or four, and 29% of children aged five to 
twelve. BARBARA WILLER ET AL., THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF CHILD CARE IN 1990: JOINT FINDINGS 
FROM THE NATIONAL CHILD CARE SURVEY 1990 AND A 'PROFILE OF CHILD CARE SETTINGS 3, 14-15 
(1991) (Sponsors of The National Child Care Survey 1990 include the National Association for the 
Education of Young Children and the Head Start Bureau of the Administration on Children, Youth and 
Families in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; the sponsor of A Profile o/Child Care 
Settings is the Office of Policy and Planning in the U.S. Department of Education), The percentages of 
children using center-based care are derived from figures for children whose mothers are employed. [d. 
at 15. "Substantial usage of supplemental care is almost exclusively limited to families in which the 
mother is employed." [d. at 14. For figures that include less substantial use of child care, but are quite 
similar, see id. at 9-14. Another recent analysis estimated that in 1987 only 30% of primary child care 
arrangements for children younger than five, with mothers working full-time, were "child care centers 
or preschools." THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, supra note 8, at 40. 
Probably fewer than 15% of the centers are publicly run. Among all child care centers in the United 
States, which include "[e]stablishments where children are cared for in a group in a nonresidential 
setting for all or part of the day," WILLER ET AL., supra, at 3, 8% are sponsored by public schools; 9% 
are sponsored by the federal Head Start program; and another 8% are nonprofit programs sponsored by 
other non-religious sponsors-a group that includes public community agencies, private agencies, and 
employers. [d, at 18. In assessing the significance of the Head Start-related percentage, the reader should 
note that only approximately 20% of the federally funded Head Start programs nationwide operate for 
the full day. AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 167. And, most Head Start programs only operate 
during the school year. THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, supra note 8, at 45. 
23. See supra note 9 (discussing the CCDBG's definitions of "group home child care" and "family 
child care" and the statute's definition of relative care that qualifies for aid). WILLER ET AL., supra note 
22, defines "relative care" as "care provided by a relative in the child's home or the relative's home"; 
"family day care" as "care provided for a small grqup of children in the caregiver's home"; and, "in-
home care" as "care provided by a non-relative who comes into the family home." [d. at 3. The report's 
definition of "family day care" thus includes both the CCDBG's group home care .and family child care. 
(Twenty-one percent of families relying on relatives, according to the report, pay the relative who is 
providing care. [d. at 22.) 
24. According to one source, the following percentages of children who spend substantial time in 
child care use one of these three types of care for more hours per week than other types: 67% of 
children younger than three, 44% of children aged three or four, and 71% of children aged five to 
twelve. WILLER ET AL., supra note 22. (These percentages are derived from the figures for children 
whose mothers are employed. For breakdowns by type of care, and for similar figures that include less 
substantial use of child care, see id. at 9-14.) 
Another study used census data to estimate the types of care used by families with mothers working 
full-time and children younger than five: relatives, 39%; non-relatives in child's home, 6%; and family 
day care homes, 25%. THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, supra note 8, at 50. 
25. See supra notes 22-24. 
26. According to WILLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 21, only 15% of early education and child care 
centers for children younger than six describe themselves as sponsored by religious organizations. 
"Among the religious organizations that sponsor center-based early education and care programs, 
religious private schools constitute only a small percentage of religious sponsors (3 percent)." ELLEN 
E. KISKER ET AL., 1 A PROFILE OF CHILD CARE SETTINGS: EARLY EDUCATION AND CARE IN 1990, at 
33 (1991) (one of the two studies summarized in WILLER ET AL., supra note 22). The proportion of 
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by religious organizations, only a minority may actually offer sectarian 
programs that include religious worship or instruction.27 
Prior to enacting the CCDBG, the Federal Government already provided 
substantial financial assistance to this child care system. This assistance 
included aid distributed through welfare- and social service-related pro-
grams,28 as well as significant subsidies of child care services through the 
federal income tax system.29 The welfare- and social service-related 
centers sponsored by religious organizations is "twice as high in suburban areas as in rural areas (10 
percent versus 5 percent) ..•. In addition, nonprofit centers in lower-income areas are less likely to be 
sponsored by a religious group than are nonprofit centers in higher-income areas (32 percent versus 43 
percent)." [d. at 38 (emphasis added). (Comparable data is not available for before- and after-school 
programs.) However, 28% of center-based programs report that they are located in a church or 
synagogue. [d. at 43-44. 
At the time of the congressional debates on the child care funding schemes that ultimately led to the 
CCDBG, this type of national survey data was not yet available. The debates reflected a shared 
rough-and roughly phrased-estimate that approximately one-third of child care is religiously affiliated 
to some degree. For example: "[C]hurches are the single largest provider of formalized child care in the 
United States, supplying about one-third of all center-based care." S. REp. No. 17, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
67 (1989) (Additional and Minority Views, Additional Views of Sen. Durenberger). "Religious 
organizations provide over one-third of child care services in this country and are often the only 
providers in low-income neighborhoods and rural communities." 136 CONGo REc. H1315 (dailyed. Mar. 
29, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins); see also 136 CONGo REc. H1309 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) 
(statement of Rep. Bartlett); S. REp. No. 484, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1988) (Additional Views of 
Sen. Quayle); S. REp. No. 17, supra, at 70 (Minority Views of Sens. Coats, Cochran, and Thurmond). 
27. One of the two studies summarized in WILLER ET AL., supra note 22, reports that fewer than 
5% percent of all center-based early education and child care programs for children younger than six 
identified providing religious instruction as their most important goal. KISKER ET AL., supra note 26, 
at 84. However, 27% of center-based program directors included religious instruction as "one of their 
program goals." WILLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 36. (Comparable data is not available for before- and 
after-school care.) 
In the early 1980's the National Council of Churches sponsored a national study of child care services 
affiliated with parishes of 15 of the Protestant, Anglican, and Orthodox denominations that belonged 
to the organization. ELLEN W. LINDNER ET AL., WHEN CHURCHES MIND TIlE CHILDREN: A STUDY OF 
DAY CARE IN LoCAL PARISHES 4, 11-13 (1983). The study reported that the child care services affiliated 
with the almost 9000 parishes surveyed were "not distinctly religious." [d. at 75. (These services 
included before- and after-school care although programs for preschoolers were "far and away the most 
prevalent" [d. at 23.) 
[S]ymbols, practices, and teachings commonly viewed as "religious" are conspicuously absent 
from most church-operated programs. Church-operated centers are no more likely than 
independently operated centers [housed in churches] to restrict enrollment to members of the 
congregation, and both are very unlikely to do so. Church-operated centers are somewhat more 
likely to be concerned with the "spiritual development of the child" than are independently 
operated centers, but only a small minority of centers consider this a high priority goal. The 
single area in which religion figures prominently is staff selection: church-operated centers are 
much more likely to give some consideration to religious beliefs when hiring staff. Thus, while 
the staff of church-operated centers are perhaps more likely to be professed Christians and 
probably more likely to be members of the congregation of the church in which the center is 
housed, the programs they offer are generally open to the community and not distinctly 
religious. 
[d. at 75. 
28. See supra notes 7-8. 
29. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text 
Using the federal tax system to assist working parents with child care costs has been criticized on 
the ground that the measures provided by Congress have not been helpful to the lowest income workers 
who owe little or no taxes. For example, The Children's Defense Fund ("CDF'), a national advocacy 
group, has argued that these measures are of little or no benefit to poor families. With respect to the 
most significant tax preference, the dependent care tax credit (see infra note 31), the CDF has 
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programs, with expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars annually, serve 
families with very low incomes.3o The tax-related aid is available to all 
families that pay taxes, and accounts for the bulk of all federal child care 
assistance.31 No statutory or regulatory provisions restrict the use of these 
types of aid for religiously affiliated child care.32 
Parents who incur child care expenses enjoy significant federal income tax 
benefits under two different tax measures. The child care tax credit allows 
working parents to subtract from their tax liability up to $1440 of their child 
care expenses, with the amount determined by their income level and their 
child care costS.33 The magnitude of this subsidy is illustrated by the credits 
claimed by taxpayers in 1990: $2.5 billion.34 A smaller but still sizeable 
maintained: 
For almost all families living in or near poverty, however, this credit system is of no practical 
use. First, they cannot afford to make substantial out-of-pocket payments for child care •..• 
Second, their federal income tax liabilities •.. almost always will be so low ... that having 
a credit to subtract provides no relief. 
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET FY 1988, at 210 (1987). The group 
recommended increasing the percentage of expenses subject to the credit and making it refundable. ld. 
at 19. Congress considered making the credit a refundable one, payable through a worker's wages, but 
this plan ultimately did not emerge as part of the legislative package that included the CCDBG. The 
Senate earlier in 1990 had passed a child care bill that included a provision making the dependent care 
credit refundable. S. 5, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 212 (1989), reprinted in 135 CONGo REc. S7492 (daily 
ed. Apr. 24, 1989). 
30. See supra notes 7-8. 
31. "[B]y the early 1980s direct consumer subsidies, which primarily benefit middle- and upper-
income families, had become the predominant form of federal support for child care, and they have 
greatly increased since then .... In particular, the child care tax credit, which accounted for about one-
third of total federal expenditures at the beginning of this decade, now accounts for nearly two-thirds." 
WILLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 196-97; see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
32. The only exception is the Head Start Program, which incidentally provides child care, see supra 
note 8, and which prohibits discrimination "because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, political 
affiliation, or belief." 42 U.S.C. § 9849(a) (1988) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause case "law does not require any such restrictions for a 
statute to survive a facial challenge, although such restrictions can be an important ingredient in a 
constitutional aid-to-religious-institutions scheme. See infra notes 121-22 and 252 and accompanying 
text. 
33. The expenses for dependent care must be employment-related, and they must be for the care 
of a child younger than 13, or for care provided in the household for a spouse or dependent adult, or 
for care provided outside of the house for a spouse or dependent adult if the person receiving care 
spends at least eight hours a day in the household. 26 U.S.C. §§ 21(a)-(c) (1988). 
34. The $2.5 billion in credits was claimed by 6,910,356 taxpayers. Telephone Interview with John 
Szilagyi, Chairman of Deferred Tax Consequences Programs, Research Division, U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service (July 16, 1992) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with John Szilagyi]. In 1989 the credit 
accounted for $2.45 billion in credits claimed by 6,091,356 taxpayers. WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CHILD 
CARE IN 1989?: A TREND REVERSAL AND AN APPARENT CONTRADIcrION 1 (1991) (report of the 
Internal Revenue Service Research Division) [hereinafter IRS REPORT]. The amount claimed in 1989 
represented a dramatic reduction from the amount claimed the year before, $3.7 billion. ld. The Internal 
Revenue Service has speculated that this reduction may be due to three factors: (1) the new requirement 
that taxpayers provide the "taxpayer identification number" (''TIN'') of their child care provider, which 
apparently led taxpayers to forego the credit either if they had been improperly claiming it or if their 
providers refused to give them a TIN because the providers did not want to report the income they were 
receiving; (2) the change in the qualifying child age limitations from under age 15 in 1988 to under age 
13 in 1989; and (3) the new provision that taxpayers must reduce the amount of their expenses eligible 
for the credit by the amount of money they receive tax-free under an employer-provided dependent care 
assistance program. ld. at 1-2. 
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subsidy is provided through employer-sponsored dependent care assistance 
programs. Federal tax law allows participating employers to deduct, at an ' 
employee's option, up to five thousand dollars from the employee's gross 
income to be used, for child care. The employee avoids federal, state, and 
local taxation of the deducted amount.3S Internal Revenue Service data 
indicates that in the 1990 tax year, employer-sponsored assistance of this kind 
was provided to 588,147 employees.36 
II. THE STATUTE 
The CCDBG reflects a legislative preference for preserving and improving 
this predominantly private and decentralized system of child care, one which 
offers a diverse range of choices for families.37 The legislation seeks to 
ensure that the system provides services that are adequate, sufficiently 
available, and affordable for working families.38 In light of the congressional 
preference for a largely private system and the significant participation of 
religiously affiliated providers in the private system, Congress was faced with 
Most of the expeoses for which taxpayers claim credit are child care expeoses rather than expeoses 
for the care of disabled older children or adults. AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 196-97. A study 
being conducted by the Internal Revenue Service, using a sample of225,700 tax returns for 1990, has 
found that 95.6% of taxpayers claiming the credit did so in connection with child care expeoses. 
Telephone Interview with John Szilagyi, supra. 
35. 26 U.S.C. §§ 125, 129 (1988). The $5000 limit is available to a single parent, or to a married 
parent filing jointly with his or her spouse, when the spouse is not receiving this employer-sponsored 
benefit. The maximum is $2500 in the case of a separate return by a married individual. ld. § 129(a)(2). 
The same expeoses qualify for these benefits as qualify for the dependent care credit. ld. § 129(e)(I). 
A taxpayer who receives this kind of assistance must reduce the amount of the taxpayer's expenses 
eligible for the dependent care credit. 26 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1988). Therefore, the employee may not also 
enjoy a tax credit if his or her employer-provided assistance is $2400 or more for one child, or $4800 
or more for two or more children. 
36. Telephone Interview with John Szilagyi, supra note 34. The same expeoses that qualify for the 
dependent care tax credit qualify for this tax preference. See supra note 35. Because almost all of the 
dependent care credits taken by taxpayers are attributable to child care expeoses, supra note 34, it is 
likely that most of the income set aside under this tax preference is also for child care expeoses. 
Telephone Interview with John Szilagyi, supra note 34 (referencing IRS study of dependent care credit 
use). 
37. The House conference report explaios: 
The managers believe that parents should have the greatest choice possible in selecting child 
care for their children. Thus, parents •.. would have complete discretion to choose from a 
wide range of child care arrangements, including care by relatives, churches, synagogues, 
family providers, centers, schools, and employers. 
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 964, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 923 (1990). 
As described in supra notes 9, 22-24 and accompanying text, the CCDBG operates to support, 
improve, and expand the existing child care system, which is a largely private system. 
38. In the words of the Hoose conference report on the legislation: 
The purpose of this block grant program is to increase the availability, affordability, and quality 
of child care. The provision provides financial assistance to low-income, working families to 
help them find and afford quality child care services for their children. It also contains 
provisioos to enhance the quality and increase the supply of child care available to all parents, 
including those who receive no financial assistance under the block grant program. 
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 964, supra note 37, at 922. 
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the necessity of considering what role religiously affiliated services could play 
in the CCDBG scheme without violating Establishment Clause principles.39 
39. Including religiously affiliated services raises the issue of possible political divisiveness along 
religious lines, a possibility that has concerned the Court in a number of cases involving direct financial 
assistance to parochial schools. The Court has foreseen that competition among religious groups for 
government aid could lead to political strife along religious lines, especially when aid programs require 
annual appropriations and provide assistance to relatively few religious groups. The Court addressed this 
concern regarding political divisiveness most recently in the 1992 graduation prayer case. Lee v. 
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The Court stated: 
The reason for the choice of a rabbi is not disclosed by the record, but the potential for 
divisiveness over the choice of a particular member of the clergy to conduct the ceremony is 
apparent. 
Divisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision respecting religions, and neither its 
existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates the State's attempts to accommodate religion 
in all cases. 
Id. at 2655-56. 
During the legislative battles that ultimately led to the passage of the CCDBG, interest groups did 
align along religious lines. For example, the United States Catholic Conference sought greater 
participation for religiously affiliated programs, and some national Jewish and Christian coalitions 
supported more restrictive church-and-state provisions. See. e.g., Richard T. Foltin & Judith Golub, 
Congress Should Pass Child Care This Session; Civil Rights Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1988, at A22; 
Linda Greenhouse, Church-State Debate Blocks Day Care Bill, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 8, 1988. at B9; Letter 
from Mary Anderson Cooper, Acting Director, National Council of Churches, and Patrick Conover, 
Associate for Policy Advocacy, United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society, to "Representa-
tive," (Oct. 19, 1989) [hereinafter Letter] (on file with the author) (expressing support by the coalition 
for House-passed legislation, 136 CONGo REc. HI290 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990), and for Senate-passed 
legislation, 135 CONGo REC. S7479 (daily ed. June 23, 1989), both of which provided a blanket 
prohibition on sectarian activities as well as restrictions on religious discrimination in admissions and 
employment. 
Nevertheless, the political divisiveness concern is not as acute here as in the school cases. Unlike the 
nation's elementary and secondary school system, the child care system described in the preceding part 
of this Article is a predominantly private rather than public one, and a minority rather than a majority 
of its private providers are religiously affiliated. Among those child care providers that are religiously 
affiliated, a wider variety of religious groups are represented than are represented in the Court's 
parochial school aid cases. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; Letter, supra, at I (asserting 
that a large, diverse coalition of Protestant denominations and faith groups "provide[s] the great majority 
of religiously based child care"); Aguilar V. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 406 (1985) (of the 13.2% of eligible 
students enrolled in private schools, 84% were enrolled in Roman Catholic schools and 8% in Hebrew 
day schools); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 379 & nA (1985) (40 of41 private schools 
were sectarian, of which 28 were Roman Catholic, seven Christian Reformed, three Lutheran, one 
Seventh-Day Adventist, and one Baptist); Mueller V. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,405 (1983) (dissent) (more 
than 95% of students in private schools attended sectarian schools); Wolman V. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 
234 (1977) (more than 96% of privately enrolled students attended sectarian schools, and more than 92% 
attended Catholic schools); Meek V. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975) (75% of qualifying private 
schools were church-related or religiously affiliated); Sloan V. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973) (more 
than 90% of children in private schools were enrolled in schools controlled by religious organizations 
or having religious purposes); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty V. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 
768 & n.23 (1973) (approximately 85% of private schools were church affiliated, consisting of 1415 
Roman Catholic schools, 164 Jewish, 59 Lutheran, 49 Episcopal, 37 Seventh-Day Adventist, and 18 
others); Lemon V. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 608, 610 (1971) (95% of Rhode Island's non-pUblic school 
pupils attended Roman Catholic schools; more than 96% of the Pennsylvania non-public school pupils 
attended church-related schools, most of which were Roman Catholic); Everson V. Board of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1,30 n.7 (1947) (dissent) (all private schools involved were Catholic schools); see also Roemer 
V. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that "political 
divisiveness is diminished by the fact that the aid is extended to private colleges generally, more than 
two-thirds of which have no religious affiliation''). 
Therefore, in considering whether to fund religiously affiliated child care, the polity is not required 
to decide whether to extend resources beyond a public secular system to a largely sectarian private 
system which is dominated by a small number of denominations. See George Tobin, Day Care and the 
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A. General Provisions 
The child care statute represents a hasty and uneasy compromise among 
widely differing views about the best ways both of assisting lower-income 
families and of maintaining a constitutionally permissible and desirable 
relationship between church and state. There were deep divisions between the 
White House and Congress and within Congress itself.40 The Senate and the 
House of Representatives had each passed child care bills,41 both of which 
were somewhat different from and more financially generous than the 
CCDBG, before the CCDBG emerged as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990.42 These bills culminated a three-year legislative 
effort that began with the introduction of the original Act for Better Child 
Care Services ("ABC").43 The u.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services CCDBG Interim Final Rule attempted to disclaim the statute's 
Establishment Clause: The Constitutionality of the Certificate Program in S. 5. the "ABC" Bill, 12 GEO. 
MAsON U. L. REv. 317, 337-38 (1990). 
40. See. e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Despite Support. a Child Care Bill Fails to Emerge, N.Y. TiMES, 
June 6, 1988, at A14; Steven A. Holmes, Tentative Accord Reached on Child Care for Low-Income 
Families, N.Y. nMES, Oct. 27, 1990, § 1, at 10; Julie Jolmson, Child Care: No Shortage of Proposals, 
N.Y. nMES, Mar. 26, 1989, at E5; Martin Tolchin, Deep Divisions Emerge in Congress on Ways to 
Expand Aid for Child Care, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 11, 1989, § 1, at 12. 
41. The Senate bill was introduced in the previous Congress as S. 5, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 
reprinted in 136 CONGo REc. S4865 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1990). It passed during that session, with an 
authorization for fiscal year 1991 ofS1.75 billion. Id. § 104(a) (passed June 23, 1989), reprinted in 135 
CONGo REc. S7479 (daily ed. June 23, 1989). 
The House, in the next session of Congress, passed H.R. 3, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted 
in 136 CONGo REc. HI290 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990), which included an authorization of $450 million 
to pay for child care expenses in fiscal year 1991 (as a new part of Title XX of the Social Security Act), 
id. § 301 (passed on Mar. 23, 1990), as well as an authorization of$429,000 to assist with the expansion 
or establishment of child care services, and an authorization of $260 million to help improve the quality 
of child care. Id. 
After the House passed H.R. 3 in the next session of Congress, the Senate again passed S. 5, under 
the number of, and as a substitute for, the House bill, in order to request a conference with the House 
on child care legislation. 136 CONGo REc. S4863 (1990) (passed on April 24, 1990). (The only changes 
made by the Senate to S. 5 involved the federal earned income credit and not the child care provisions 
that are the subject of this Article. Id. References in this Article to the child care provisions of S. 5 as 
passed are to S. 5 as it was originally passed by the Senate during the first session of the 101st Congress 
on June 23, 1989.) 
42. Child Care and Development Block Grant, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-236 (1990). The 
CCDBG was part of a legislative package that also included an expansion of Head Start, Augustus F. 
Hawkins Human Service Reauthorization Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-501, 104 Stat. 1222 (1990); a new 
welfare-related program that enables states to provide child care funds to families that are not receiving 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC',) but are at risk of becoming eligible for AFDC 
without such aid, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-233 
(1990); and, an expansion of the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC',), Revenue Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-400 (1990). The expansion of the EITC generalIy 
increased this refundable credit for low-income families in addition to (1) providing a larger benefit for 
families with more than one child, or with a child under the age of one, and (2) allowing a new credit 
for payments for children's health insurance. Id. at 1388-1408 to -1412. 
43. S. 1885, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (reported out by the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources, S. REp. No. 484, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1988), but not passed); H.R. 3660, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (reported out by the Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REp. No. 985, 
100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1988), but not passed); see supra note 41 (regarding the bills passed in 
1989 and 1990). An intermediate version of these bills was H.R. 30, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (not 
reported out). 
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history, asserting that "the Congressional leadership and the Administration 
agreed to start anew in crafting this legislation. As a result, there is relatively 
little legislative history that is instructive in drafting regulations that reflect 
the clear intent of the law."44 Although the CCDBG departs in significant 
ways from the House and Senate bills,45 the structure and language of its 
church-and-state provisions did evolve directly from these earlier bills.46 
The CCDBG authorizes upwards of one billion dollars annually to be 
distributed in block grants to participating states.47 No matching state funds 
44.56 Fed. Reg. 26,194 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 98-99) (proposed June 6, 1991). The 
Department characterized PIe history of the CCDBG as follows: 
The Child Care and Development Block Grant was worked out in the final days of the 10ist 
Congress after two years of protracted debate within Congress and between Congress and the 
Administration. The bill was the result of a new compromise between the House, the Senate, 
and the Administration. The bills which individually passed the House (H.R. 3) and the Senate 
(S. 5) were not the basis for crafting the compromise, as the Congressional leadership and the 
Administration agreed to start anew in crafting this legislation. 
ld. Unpersuaded by arguments to the contrary, the Department continued to maintain this position in 
its Supplementary Information published with the final regulations. 57 Fed. Reg. 34,352 (1992) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 98-99) (proposed Aug. 4, 1992). 
45. The Administration's attempt to completely disown the legislative history of the House and 
Senate bills is not persuasive. Although it abandons many features of the two bills, the compromise is 
essentially a stripped-down version of them. It contains the same basic underlying financial aid program, 
minus many of the two bills' specific federal- and state-level administrative structures, requirements, and 
procedures. The final version leaves much more discretion to the states with respect to the use of funds 
and the regulation of child care services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858p; supra note 41. 
46. For example, the CCDBG's general limitation on funding sectarian purposes and activities is 
essentially identical to the restriction in both the House and Senate bills, as well as in their precursors 
introduced during the two previous years. The CCDBG states: "No financial assistance provided under 
this subchapter, ..• or through any other grant or contract[,] ... shall be expended for any sectarian 
purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or instruction." 42 U.S.C. § 9858k(a). Compare this to 
the Senate bill, which said, "No financial assistance provided under this title shall be expended for any 
sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship and instruction." S. 5, supra note 41, § 121(a). 
The House biII passed that year said: "No financial assistance provided under this subtitle shall be 
expended for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship and instruction." H.R. 3, 
supra note 41, § 301(a) (amending § 2012(a)(2) of Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1397-1397f(1988». For nearly identical language in previous bilIs, see S. 1885, supra note 43, § 19(a); 
H.R. 30, 10ist Cong., 1st Sess. § 670P(a) (1989); and H.R. 3660, supra note 43, § 118. 
More specific church-and-state-related provisions of the CCDBG also evolved from the earlier bilIs. 
The CCDBG contains a church-and-state-related prohibition on the use ofCCDBG funds in before- and 
after-school child care programs for "(I) any services provided to such students during the regular 
school day; (2) any services for which students receive academic credit toward graduation; or (3) any 
instructional services which supplant or duplicate the academic program of any public or private school." 
42 U.S.C. § 9858k(b). An identical provision was part of both the Senate and House bilIs, as well as 
of their precursors introduced in Congress in 1988 and 1989. S. 5, supra note 41, § 121(c); H.R. 3, 
supra note 41, § 301(a) (amending § 2012(a)(2) of Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1397-1397f(1988»; S. 1885, supra note 43, § 19(c); H.R. 30, supra § 670P(b); and H.R. 3660, supra 
note 43 § 19(c). 
The CCDBG's limitations on religious discrimination in the admission of children and the 
employment of staff to work directly with them, also appeared in the bilIs passed by both the Senate 
and the House. See 42 U.S.C. § 98581; S. 5, supra note 41, §§ 122(a)(2)-(3) (1990); H.R. 3, supra note 
41, § 301(a) (amending § 2012(a)(2) ofTitle XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f 
(1988». These limitations on religious discrimination had evolved from generally more stringent 
limitations in the bilIs' precursors introduced in 1988 and 1989. See infra notes 79, 114. 
47.42 U.S.C. § 9858. The statute authorized $750 million for fiscal year 1991, $825 million for 
fiscal year 1992, $925 milIion for 1993, "and such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 
1994 and 1995." ld. For fiscal year 1991, the sum actually appropriated was $731,900,000. THE STATE 
OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, supra note 8, at 46. For fiscal year 1992, the sum actually appropriated 
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are required. The states are directed to use 75% of their allocations for two 
purposes. The principal purpose is to fund child care services for children 
whose family income is at or below 75% of the state's median income for a 
family of the same size.48 Although the statute does not specify how much 
of the 75% should be used for this purpose, the House conference report 
indicated that this purpose should account for a preponderance of this portion 
of the states' allocations.49 Assistance for eligible children is to be provided 
on a sliding fee scale, so and priority in giving assistance must be afforded 
to families with very low incomes and to children with special needs. 51 
States must give parents a choice of (1) enrolling their child in a program that 
has a grant from, or contract with, the state or (2) receiving a child care 
certificateS2 that may be used as payment for child care services.s3 A 
secondary purpose that states may fulfill with this 75% of their allocations is 
to fund "activities designed to improve the availability and quality of child 
care."S4 
States are required to use between 18.75% and 20% of the funds allocated 
to them to improve the quality and increase the availability of child caress 
was $825 million, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1992, supra note 8, at 18. 
48.42 U.S.C. §§ 9858c(c)(3)(B)-(C), 9858n(4)(B). To be eligible, a child also must be under the 
age of 13, id. § 9858n(4)(A), and either living with "a parent or parents who are working or attending 
ajob training or educational program" or receiving or in need of "protective services and resid[ing] with 
a parent or parents" who are not working or attending a job training or educational program. [d. § 
9858n( 4)(C). 
49. "It is the conferees' intent that a preponderance of the block grant funds be spent specifically 
on child care services and a minimum amount on other authorized activities." H.R. CONF. No. 964, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 923 (1990). The Department of Health and Human Services regulations quantify 
this "preponderance" as at least 90%. 45 C.F.R. § 98.50(d)(2)(i) (1992). 
50. The term "sliding fee scale" is defined as "a system of cost sharing by a family based on 
income and size of the family." 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(12). The House conference report on the CCDBG 
adds that nothing in the statute "is intended to prohibit the provision of services at no cost to families 
whose income is at or below the poverty level." H.R. CONF. REp. NO. 964, supra note 37, at 923. 
Earlier Senate and House biJIs had explicitly stated that in the case of the poorest recipients, states could 
cover 100% of the cost of child care. S. 5, supra note 41, § 3(23); H.R. 3, supra note 41, § 659C(21) 
(amending § 637 of the Head Start Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9832 (1988»; H.R. 30, supra note 43, § 670R(29); 
S. 1885, supra note 43, § 3(18); H.R. 3660, supra note 43, § 3(18). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9858c(c)(3)(B)(i). "Special needs" are not defined in the statute or by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 98.2 (1992), but they presumably 
include physical and mental disabilities that necessitate special services. 
52. Tl!e CCDBG defines a "child care certificate" as "a certificate (which may be a check or other 
disbursement) that is issued by a state or local government under this subchapter directly to a parent 
who may use such certificate only as payment for child care services." 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(2). 
53. [d. § 9858c(c)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II). The section specifies that the certificates "shall be of a value 
commensurate with the subsidy value of child care services" provided by a program under a grant or 
contract [d. § 9858c(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
When parents choose to enroll their child with a provider that has a grant or contract with the state, 
the state is required to honor the parents' choice of provider "to the maximum extent practicable." [d. 
§ 9858c(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
54. [d. § 9858c(c)(3)(B)(ii). 
55. [d. § 9858c(c)(3)(C). This section requires states to use 25% of their allocations for two distinct 
sets of activities, which are defined in other sections. One of these two sets of activities is "to establish 
or expand and conduct, through the provision of grants or contracts, early childhood development or 
before-and after-school child care programs or both." [d. § 9858£(a). States are required to use at least 
75% of the 25%, which amounts to 18.75% of their total allocations, for this set of activities. [d. For 
the other set of activities, see infra note 56 and accompanying text, the states must use at least 20% of 
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through grants and contracts that may be used to establish, expand, or conduct 
either early childhood development programs, or before- or after-school child 
care programs, or both.56 Child care certificates may not be issued with this 
portion of the states' funding.57 With the remaining 5% to 6.25% of their 
allocations, states must fund one or more of the following in order to improve 
the quality of child care: resource and referral programs; grants or loans to 
help providers meet state and local standards; improvements in monitoring 
compliance with licensing and regulatory requirements; training and technical 
assistance; and increased comp"ensation of staff who provide child care for 
which the CCDBG gives assistance.58 
Under the CCDBG, states must provide assurances that for all subsidized 
child care services, state or local requirements are in effect that are "designed 
to protect the health and safety of children" and that include requirements 
regarding "prevention and control of infectious diseases," "building and 
physical premises safety," and "minimum health and safety training appropri-
ate to the provider setting."59 Providers of subsidized care must comply with 
all state and local licensing and regulatory requirements.6o Beyond this, 
states are not required to regulate child care. However, if a provider is not 
required by state or local law to be licensed or regulated, then it must be 
registered with the state to receive the funding. 61 On the other hand, states 
the 25%, which consists of 5% of their total allocations. 42 U.S.C. § 9858(e). Thus, states must use a 
minimum of 18.75% of their total allocations for the set of activities described in this note and may use 
up to 20%, if they limit their expenditures for the other set of activities to the required minimum for 
that set of activities, which is 5% of their total expenditures. 
56.42 U.S.C. § 9858f(c). The statute mandates: 
In awarding grants and contracts under this section, the State shall give the highest priority to 
geographic areas within the State that are eligible to receive grants under section 2712 of Title 
20, and shall tJIen give priority to-
(1) any other areas with concentrations of poverty; and 
(2) any areas with very high or very low population densities. 
ld. § 9858f(c). 
57. The permissible uses of this portion of the states' funding are set out in id. §§ 9858c(c)(3)(C), 
9858e, 9858f. 
58. ld. § 9858e. For these activities, states are required to use at least 20% of 25% of their total 
allocations, which amounts to 5% of their total allocations. But states may use up to 6.25% of their total 
allocations for these purposes if they limit their expenditures for the other activities funded with this 
25% of their allocations to the required minimum for those activities. See supra note 55. 
Other requirements imposed by the CCDBG on the states include: using CCDBG funds to supplement 
rather than to supplant other public funding of child care, 42 U.S.C. § 9858c(c)(2)(J), assuring that 
parents will have unlimited access to their children while their children are in care, maintaining a system 
for parental complaints, ensuring the availability of consumer information, and enforcing state and local 
licensing and regulatory requirements. ld. §§ 9858c(c)(2)(B)-(E). 
59.42 U.S.C. §§ 9858c(c)(2)(F)-(G). The CCDBG also requires that if a state reduces the level of 
standards applicable to child care services, it must inform the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services "of the rationale for such reduction." ld. § 9858c(c)(2)(H). In addition, 
states must complete a review of "the law applicable to, and the licensing and regulatory requirements 
and policies of, each licensing agency that regulates child care services and programs in the State unless 
the State reviewed such law, requirements, and policies in the 3-year period ending on [the date of the 
enactment of the CCDBG.]" ld. § 9858c(c)(2)(I). 
60.ld. § 9858c(c)(2)(E). 
61. ld. § 9858c(c)(2)(E)(ii). Such providers must be permitted to register with the state after they 
have been selected by parents. ld. 
1993] RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED CHILD CARE 53 
are specifically permitted to impose more stringent standards on child care 
providers that offer services funded under the CCDBG.62 
B. Church-and-State Provisions 
Congress struggled to create provisions for the grant and contract fundi~g 
mechanism that would satisfy the dictates of the Establishment Clause, yet 
allow substantial participation by religiously affiliated child care programs. 
Numerous interest groups participated in a multi-year process of debate and 
negotiation over these provisions. Some of these groups advocated an 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that would permit extensive 
participation by religiously affiliated providers, including providers of 
sectarian services; others advocated interpreting the clause to limit the 
participation of such providers; and still others wanted primarily to secure the 
enactment of legislation making federal child care assistance generally 
available to low-income families.63 
The measures finally agreed upon provide that no financial assistance given 
under a grant or contract with a child care program is to be "expended for any 
sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or instruction."64 
62. Id. § 9858c(c)(2)(E). 
63. The original versions of the CCDBG's precursor, the ABC, contained the strictest church-and-
state restrictions, prohibiting any use of funds for sectarian activities, any religious discrimination in 
employment, and so forth. S. 1885, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 19 (1988); H.R. 3660, 100th Cong., 1st 
Sess. §§ 19-20 (1987). These versions of the bill were supported by a coalition that included many 
Christian and Jewish groups, but they were unacceptable to the United States Catholic Conference. 
Greenhouse, supra note 39, at B9. When the bills were modified to permit some religious discrimination 
in admissions policies and to remove some restrictions on discrimination in employment, while retaining 
the prohibitions on funding sectarian services, S. REp. No. 484, supra note 43, pt. 1, at 53 (S. 1885, § 
19(b) as reported); H.R. REp. No. 985, supra note 43, pt.l (H.R. 3660 as reported), opposition was 
expressed by a number of groups, including the National Education ASsociation, the American Jewish 
Committee, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, and the National Parents and Teacher's 
Association. Greenhouse, supra note 39, at B9. See also Florence Flast, (Committee for Public 
Education and Religious Liberty), Child-Care Bill Aids Churches. Not Parents, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 
1989, at A28; Robert L. Maddox, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Child-Care 
Plan Raises Church-State Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1989, § 1, at 22. The president of the Children's 
Defense Fund, which led the coalition supporting the bill, "urged coalition members to compromise on 
the church-state issue, leaving it to the courts rather than imperil the bill's momentum. 'There are later 
forums for all concerned to pursue church-state concerns after the bill is enacted,' she wrote in February 
in a memorandum to the coalition groups." Greenhouse, supra note 39, at B9. Senator Christopher J. 
Dodd, the sponsor of the legislation, also "said that as a practical matter, it was important to 
accommodate the churches, pass a bill and let the courts make the ultimate judgment." Id. When 
Congress debated whether to permit parents to use govemment-issued vouchers to purchase sectarian 
services, there was again sharp disagreement. See infra note 70. And there were numerous expressions 
of the desire to leave the matter to the courts. See infra note 72. Groups that opposed such use of 
vouchers included the National Council of Churches, the American Baptist Churches, the American 
Jewish Committee, the United Church of Christ, and the United Methodist Church. 136 CONGo REc. 
H13l9-20 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statements of Reps. Morella, Edwards, and Williams). Groups that 
supported such use included Council for American Private Education, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 
National Association of Episcopal Schools, National Catholic Educational Association, National Society 
for Hebrew Day Schools, and Seventh-Day Adventist Board of Education. 135 CONGo REc. S7169 (daily 
ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Durenberger, inserting a letter into the record from a number of 
groups). 
64.42 U.S.C. § 9858k(a) (emphasis added). 
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The statute itself does not define the phrase "sectarian purpose or activity." 
As explained in Part III, the meaning of the statute, read as a whole, is that 
the states may not fund through grants and contracts any programs that 
engage in sectarian activities.65 Religiously affiliated programs that do not 
engage in religious activities may participate in the statute's grant and 
contract aid scheme, subject to certain restrictions on religious discrimination 
in admitting children and hiring employees.66 
The CCDBG specifies that child care certificates may be used to purchase 
"sectarian child care services."67 The statute does not further describe or 
define such services, but federal regulations state that the terms "sectarian 
organization" and "sectarian child care provider" include "any organization 
or provider that engages in religious conduct or activity, or that seeks to 
maintain a religious identity in some or all of its functions."68 The provision 
allowing certificates to be used for sectarian services was engrafted onto the 
statute late in its legislative history, such use having been rejected in earlier 
versions of the legislation.69 Unlike the complex church-and-state-related 
regulations governing grant and contract aid, this provision was not a product 
of protracted debate, negotiation, and compromise. There was sharp 
disagreement during the legislative process about whether it would be 
constitutional to allow parents to redeem these vouchers for sectarian child 
care.70 When it appeared that the act could not pass without a provision 
permitting their use for sectarian services, Congress adopted such a provision 
in later versions of the statute.71 The view was expressed in debate, and 
65. See infra notes 92, 97, 99-111 and accompanying text. 
66. See infra notes 93, 98, 112-16 and accompanying text. 
67. ''Nothing in this subchapter shall preclude the use of such certificates for sectarian child care 
services if freely chosen by the parent." 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(2). 
68. 45 C.F.R. § 98.2(ii) (1992). The regulation also states that the terms mean "religious 
organizations or religious providers generally .... There is no requirement that a sectarian organization 
or provider be managed by clergy or have any particular degree of religious management, control, or 
content." ld. "Sectarian purposes and activities" are defined as "any religious purpose or activity, 
including but not limited to religious worship or instruction." ld. § 98.2(jj). 
69. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text; infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
70. See. e.g., 136 CONGo REc. H1320 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (use for sectarian services does 
"honor the [C]ourt's standards'); id. at H1265 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Rep. Ford) ("no 
doubt in my mind that [it] is unconstitutional'); 135 CONGo REc. S7441 (daily ed. June 23, 1989) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch) ("many authorities agree ... [it] is constitutionaI'); 135 CONGo REC. S7184 . 
(daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("all the words in the dictionary cannot 
possibly make that which is unconstitutional constitutional'); id. at S7168 (daily ed. June 22, 1989) 
(statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("no [E]stablishment [C]lause reason why the certificate program should 
be restricted" to nonsectarian services); id. at S7153 (daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. 
Packwood) ("[use of vouchers for sectarian services] is probably actually unconstitutional'); Steven A. 
Holmes, House. 265-145. Votes to Widen Day Care Programs in the Nation, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 30, 
1990, at AI; Tolchin, supra note 40, at 12. 
71. In June 1989, the Senate first passed a version of the legislation that permitted the use of 
vouchers for sectarian child care services. S. 5, supra note 41, § 12(a). In discussion on the floor of the 
Senate, Senator Glenn expressed his opposition to the provision, quoting with approval an editorial in 
The Washington Post that stated: 
In another important area the bill has been disfigured, however; to pick up votes, the 
sponsors have abandoned principles they would otherwise uphold and agreed to give public 
funds to sectarian programs. Congress would stop defending the Constitution and put that entire 
burden on the courts. Badly as the sponsors want child care, they cannot want it this badly; the 
1993] RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED CHILD CARE 55 
embodied in a version of the provision that passed in both Houses, that 
instead of attempting to finally resolve the close constitutional question, 
Congress should simply approve the measure and leave the issue to the 
courtS.72 
In addition to identifying which CCDBG funds can be used for sectarian 
services, the statute imposes restrictions on religious discrimination in 
admissions and employment. Programs that receive grant and contract aid are 
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of religion in the admission of 
children. According to the federal regulations promulgated under the statute, 
the prohibition does not apply to providers that receive CCDBG funds solely 
through child care certificates.73 However, the regulatory interpretation is 
questionable because, on balance, the statute by its terms applies the ban to 
these providers as well.74 The prohibition on discrimination in admissions is 
provision needs to be fixed. 
135 CONGo REc. S7181-82 (daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Glenn). Senator Dodd conceded 
in response: 
[1] have talked [to] virtually, I would say, almost every colleague here on both sides of the 
aisle about this. It was quite clear that this was a feeling that was held very strongly by many, 
and that they would not be wiIling to support a major effort in child care in the absence of 
some language in here ..•. [T]his could have been left, I suppose, to a battle out here on the 
floor, an amendment fight, which I would say, candidly, those who support the use of 
certificates and religious-based child-care providers would have prevailed .... In any piece of 
legislation, there is a give and take along the way. 
ld. at H7182 (daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
In March 1990, the House frrst passed a version of the biIl that permitted the use of vouchers for 
sectarian child care servic~s. H.R. 3, supra note 41, § 2012(a)(2)(A). The House had rejected (by a vote 
of297 to 125) an amendment that would have, like earlier versions of the legislation, simply prohibited 
the use of any funds for sectarian activities. 136 CONGo REc. H1322 (daily ed., Mar. 29,1990). 
72. The biIls passed in the Senate and the House allowing the use of certificates for sectarian 
services included the qualifying statement that "[fjinancial assistance provided under this subtitle shaH 
not be expended in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution." S. 5, supra note 41, § 12I(a); H.R. 
3, supra note 41, § 301. Senator Kennedy explained: 
I know that some Senators are concerned about the constitutionality of permitting child-care 
certificates to be used for sectarian care. It is a close and difficult question. Our biIl draws a 
line coextensive with the Constitution's limits. Ifintervening Supreme Court decisions or other 
developments were to make it clear that there is a constitutional problem, then the language 
of the substitute itself would forbid the use of Federal funds for this purpose. 
135 CONGo REc. S7144 (daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). A supporter of the bill, 
who stated his view that the use of vouchers for sectarian services is unconstitutional, continued: "The 
provision ••• which requires consistency with the Constitution would not therefore authorize Federal 
funds to be used in such a manner ••.. I recognize that there are conflicting legal opinions regarding 
this issue and that ultimately the issue may be resolved in the courts. That is not, however, an 
uncommon result •.•• " ld. at S7159 (daily ed. June 22,1989) (statement of Sen. Cranston). 
73. "Child care providers (other than family child care providers ... ) that receive assistance through 
grants and contracts under the Block Grant shaH not discriminate in admission against any child on the 
basis of religion." 45 C.F.R. § 98.46(a) (1992). 
74. The statute states that "[a] child care provider (other than a family child care provider) that 
receives assistance under this subchapter shaH not discriminate against any child on the basis of religion 
in providing child care services." 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(2)(A). The regulations interpret the phrase 
"[ c ]hild care provider that receives assistance under this subchapter" as meaning a provider that receives 
CCDBG aid through grants or contracts rather than only through certificate programs, 45 C.F.R. § 
98.2(k) (1992), distinguishing that phrase from the phrase "services for which assistance is made 
available under the Act." 57 Fed. Reg. 34,359, 34,383-84 (1992) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 98-99) 
(proposed Aug. 4, 1992). 
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subject to one significant exception: a child who will not occupy a slot funded 
under the CCDBG may be given preference if the child or the child's family 
members "participate on a regular basis in other activities of the organization 
that owns or operates such provider,"7s which may be a church or a 
parochial schoo1.76 This exception is not available, however, if the total of 
While it is true that some other sections of the statute do use alternate phrasing-for example, 42 
U.S.C. 9858c( c )(2)(E)(i) ("services within the State for which assistance is provided under this 
subchapter"}-this would be an excessively subtle way for Congress to make such an important 
distinction. In fact, when Congress wishes to make clear in another section of the statute that only grant 
and contract aid is involved, it does so very specifically. See id. § 9858k(a) ("financial assistance 
provided under this subchapter, pursuant to the choice ofa parent under section 9858c(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) of 
this title or through any other grant or contract under the State plan''). 
On the other hand, it seems somewhat anomalous to allow parents to redeem the statute's child care 
certificates for sectarian services while prohibiting the providers of sectarian services from discriminating 
not only in the admission of children but also in the hiring of the caregivers who will work directly with 
the children. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the restriction on employment 
discrimination, which states that a provider "that receives assistance under this subchapter shall not 
discriminate in employment on the basis of the religion of the prospective employee" if the employee 
will be working directly with children. 42 U.S.C. § 9858/(a)(3)(A». If, contrary to the regulatory 
interpretation, these restrictions on discrimination in admissions and employment apply to providers of 
sectarian services that receive certificates, then those providers must hire workers on a nondiscriminatory 
basis to teach religion and to conduct religious activities, even though an applicant's religious beliefs 
and training would probably be a bona fide qualification for the position. 
The legislative history of the prohibitions on discrimination in admissions and in employment does 
not support the regulations' subtle distinction between "providers that receive assistance" and "services 
for which assistance is made available." Most of the earlier versions of the prohibition on discrimination 
in admissions appeared in versions of the statute that included child care certificates but did not permit 
their use for sectarian services. As first reported out in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, the prohibition on discrimination in admissions explicitly applied to all forms of aid: "A child 
care provider may not discriminate against any child on the basis of religion in providing child care 
services in return for a fee paid, reimbursement received, or certificate redeemed, in whole or in part 
with financial assistance provided under" the Act H.R. 3660, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 119(b) (1988), 
reprinted in H.R. REp. No. 985, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt I (1988); S. 1885, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 
19(b) (1988), reprinted in S. REp. No. 484, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt I, at 53 (1988). 
In bills introduced in each House in the next Congress, the prohibition on discrimination in 
admissions again was explicitly applied to all forms of aid. H.R. 30, supra note 46, § 670P(d); S. 5, 
supra note 41, § 20(b). But, as reported out by the Senate in that Congress, the prohibition stated only: 
"A child care provider that receives assistance under this Act shall not discriminate against any child 
on the basis of religion in providing child care services." [d. § 20(b)(2)(A), reprinted in S. REp. No. 17, 
IOlst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 23 (1989). It was also in this reported bill that the similarly worded ban 
on employment discrimination first appeared. S. 5, § 20(b)(3)(A), reprinted in S. REp. No. 17, supra, 
at 23. Although the language in the admissions provision had changed and no longer explicitly referred 
to all types of aid, the accompanying report does not suggest that the Senate committee attached any 
significance to the change. S. REp. No. 17, supra, at 49-50. In fact, the committee report states that 
"[t]he Committee also wishes to clarify that it intends to subject federal financial assistance in the form 
of child care certificates to the same restrictions required for grants and loans provided under this Act" 
[d. at 50. 
FinaIIy, in the next Congress, before the passage of the CCDBG, the Senate passed a version of the 
legislation that included the same prohibitions on discrimination in admissions and employment, the 
ones that did not explicitly refer to all types of aid, and, for the first time, a provision exempting 
providers that receive certificates from the general ban on using funds supplied under the statute for 
sectarian purposes or activities. S. 5, supra note 41, §§ 122(b)(2)(A), 122(b)(3)(A), 121(a). In the 
absence of any indication to the contrary, the Senate either did not intend to also change the 
applicability of the bans on discrimination in admissions and employment or did not consider the 
question of changing the nondiscrimination provisions. In the CCDBG, the language of the bans on 
discrimination survived unchanged. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858/(a)(2), 9858/(a)(3). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9858/(a)(2)(B). 
76. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text 
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a child care program's public funding from all sources-federal, state, and 
local-"amounts to 80 percent or more of the operating budget."77 Under 
those circumstances, programs are prohibited from discriminating against any 
child in admission on the basis of religion,78 and thus may not give 
preference to participants in the other activities of a sectarian organization 
that owns or operates the program.79 This applies to certificate recipients as 
well as grant and contract recipients, even under the interpretation of the 
statute adopted by the federal regulations.80 
Programs that receive CCDBG funds under grants and contracts are also 
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of religion in hiring an employee 
whose "primary responsibility is or will be working directly with children in 
the provision of child care services."81 According to the federal regulations 
promulgated under the statute, this ban does not apply to providers that 
receive CCDBG funds only through child care certificates. But again, the 
regulatory interpretation is questionable, and the statute explicitly applies the 
employment discrimination ban to these providers as well.82 This limited ban 
on employment discrimination, like the admissions regulation, has one 
significant exception. Programs may give preference to an employment 
candidate for such a position who is "already participating on a ~egular basis 
in other activities of the organization that owns or operates such provider."83 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(4). 
78.Id. 
79. Some of the earlier bills considered by Congress conlained tOlal bans on religious discrimination 
in admissions if a child care provider received any federal aid, while other versions included less 
restrictive schemes in which providers could freely discriminate on the basis of religion in admitting 
children to non-funded slots. E.g., S. 1885, supra note 43 §§ 20(b) (as introduced) (prohibiting religious 
discrimination in admissions), 19(b) (as reported, S. REp. 484, supra note 27, at 53) (prohibiting 
religious discrimination in admissions only for funded slots); H.R. 3660, supra note 43 § 20(b) (1987) 
(as introduced) (prohibiting discrimination in admissions); H.R. 3600, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 119(b) 
(1987) (as reported, H. REp. 985, supra note 43 pU) (prohibiting religious discrimination in admissions 
only for funded slots). 
80.45 C.F.R. § 98.46(c) (1992). The regulations apply this provision to certificate recipients as well 
as to grant and contract recipients because the reference reads, "assistance provided under this 
subchapter[,]" instead of, "provider ... that receives assistance under" the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(4); 
see supra note 74. However, the Slatutory provision goes on in the same sentence to refer to the "budget 
of a child care provider that receives such assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(3)(A). This restriction applies to all grant and contract recipients. However, 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has interpreted the slatute otherwise, concluding 
that child care programs owned or operated by secIarian organizations are not subject to this restriction. 
See infra notes 82, 112-16 and accompanying text. 
82. 45 C.F.R. § 98.47(a)(I) (1992). The slatute slates that "[a] child care provider that receives 
assistance under this subchapter shall not discriminate in employment on the basis of the religion of the 
prospective employee if such employee's primary responsibility is or will be working directly with 
children in the provision of child care services." 42 U.S.C. 98581(a)(3)(A). The regulations interpret the 
phrase "a child care provider •.. that receives assistance under this subchapter" as meaning a provider 
that receives CCDBG aid through grants and contracts only, rather than through certificate programs. 
45 C.F.R. § 98.2(k) (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 34,359, 34,384 (1992) (regulation codified at 42 C.F.R. § 98) 
(distinguishing that phrase from the phrase "services for which assistance is made available" under the 
Act); see supra note 74 (explaining why this. subtle distinction made by the regulations is not 
persuasive). 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(3)(B). The slatute slates; 
If two or more prospective employees are qualified for any position with a child care provider 
receiving assistance under this subchapter, nothing in this section shall prohibit such child care 
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Again, this organization may be a church or parochial school. 84 If a child 
care program receives 80% or more of its operating budget from public 
sources, however, it may not discriminate in this fashion in hiring staff whose 
"primary responsibility is or will be working directly with children in the 
provision of child care. "8S But in the employment of all other staff members, 
the statute explicitly protects and guarantees the right of a sponsoring 
sectarian organization to "require that employees adhere to the religious tenets 
and teachings of such organization, and such organization may require that 
employees adhere to rules forbidding the use of drugs or a1cohol."86 
In enacting these provisi9ns concerning religious discrimination, Congress 
sought not only to satisfy Establishment Clause concerns but also to avoid 
discriminatory conduct.87 Congress distanced itself from private actors' 
religious discrimination by prohibiting such discrimination in admitting 
children to subsidized slots, and by dictating a facially neutral criteri-
on-membership in a sponsoring organization-for exercising preferences in 
provider from employing a prospective employee who is already participating on a regular 
basis in other activities of the organization that owns or operates such provider. 
Id; see also 45 C.F.R. 98.47(a)(3) (1992) (regulation based on the statutory provision). 
84. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. 
·85. 42 U.S.C. § 9858/(a)(4); 45 C.F.R. § 98.47(c) (1992) (regulation applies this provision to 
recipients of certificates as well as to recipients of grant and contract aid). 
86.42 U.S.C. §§ 9858/(a)(I)(A)-(B). Federal regulations extend this to all employees of child care 
services operated by sectarian organizations, 45 C.F.R. § 98.47(b) (1992), although this interpretation 
is not supported by the language of the statute. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. 
87. There is a question whether the receipt ofCCDBG funds would subject a provider's religious 
discrimination to constitutional review, but the answer is almost surely that it would not have this effect. 
The Supreme Court has found that the receipt of substantial public funds, even to perform a highly 
regulated function, does not make the recipient a goveromental actor. For example, in Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), the Court held that the personnel decisions of a private school for 
troubled youth were not goveromental actions even though the tuition of most of the students was paid 
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the school was performing a public function (that is, public 
education) in a regulated environment. In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), the Court held that 
the patient transfer decisions of a private nursing home were not goveromental actions even though the 
home depended on public funding, was highly regulated, and applicable regulations encouraged patient 
transfers. Given this case law, it seems clear that the receipt of CCDBG funds would not render a 
provider's admission and employment decisions subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See generally id. at 1004 (a "private decision" is not goveromental action unless the goveroment "has 
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State''). 
Furthermore, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), in an action against a state, the Supreme 
Court indicated that aid that comports with the Establishment Clause does not'implicate the goveroment 
in a recipient's discriminatory practices. Id. at 468. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state may 
not, under a law that provides free books to students in all schools, give books to students who attend 
a private school that engages in racially discriminatory practices. The Court distinguished permissible 
aid to parochial schools from aid to private schools that have racially discriminatory policies. Id. at 468-
70. "The leeway for indirect aid to sectarian schools has no place in defining the permissible scope of 
support of segregated schools through any arrangement .•.. " Id. at 464 n.7. The Court explained that 
the Constitution "places no value on discrimination" whereas "the transcendent value of free religious 
exerise in our constitutional scheme leaves room for 'play in the joints' to the extent of cautiously 
delineated secular governmental assistance to religious schools." Id. at 469-70. Such assistance "does 
not substantially promote the readily identifiable religious mission of those schools," id. at 468, and thus 
does not implicate the goveroment in the recipient's religiously motivated conduct. 
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filling non-funded slots and hiring staff who work directly with children.88 
Finally, in anticipation of possible legal attacks under state constitutions' 
religion clauses, the statute declares that no provision of a state constitution 
or state statute may be construed to prohibit "the expenditure in or by 
sectarian institutions of any Federal funds provided under this subchapter."89 
Although the provision is perhaps phrased in an unconstitutional fashion, 
Congress is presumably free under the Supremacy Clause to override any state 
law restriction on federal expenditures as long as the congressional measure 
is permissible under the Federal Constitution.90 Because no state matching 
funds are required under the CCDBG, no issue will arise concerning the 
permissibility under state law of expending such funds for religiously 
affiliated child care. However, states may wish to voluntarily add state funds. 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in fact encourages states 
to administer CCDBG funds together with other welfare-related child care aid 
programs that include state funds, thereby providing "seamless service" to 
low-income families.91 Therefore, issues may arise concerning the 
88. An additional church-and-state-related provision of the CCDBG governs the use offederal funds 
by providers to bring physical facilities into compliance with health and safety requirements. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9858d(b). The statute allows states to make funds available to all child care providers for "minor 
remodeling" of buildings and facilities, while excluding the use of funds for the purchase or 
improvement ofland. ld. These funds may not be used by sectarian agencies or organizations, however, 
"except to the extent that renovation or repair is necessary to bring [a] facility •.• into compliance with 
[the] health and safety requirements" that states are required by the CCDBG to have in effect. ld. § 
9858d(b )(2). The constitutionality of granting such funds to sectarian organizations is doubtful under 
the Supreme Court's decision in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756 (1973). In Nyquist, the Court rejected a plan that awarded pupil maintenance grants, which were 
capped at 50% of the average per-pupil cost for such services in the public schools. The Court found 
that the grants could not be paid to sectarian schools because there was no way to limit their use to the 
schools' secular activities. ld. at 774-77. 
89.42 U.S.C. § 98581(b). That subsection states: 
Nothing •.• shall be construed to supersede or modifY any provision of a State constitution 
or State law that prohibits the expenditure of public funds in or by sectarian institutions, except 
that no provision of a State constitution or State law shall be construed to prohibit the 
expenditure in or by sectarian institution of any Federal funds provided under this subchapter. 
ld.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 98.3(a) (1992). 
90. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law may of course preempt a state law provision 
respecting the use offederal funds. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 
113 S. Ct. 580 (1992). Such a preemption of state law would have the same effect as this statutory 
provision. Nevertheless, there is no constitutional authority for the Federal Government to dictate to state 
courts how to interpret state law. 
91. 45 C.F.R. § 98.12 (1992) states: "The lead agency must: (a) Coordinate the provision of services 
for which assistance is provided under this part with other Federal, State, and local child care and early 
childhood development programs, and before- and after-school programs •... " According to the 
supplementary information accompanying the interim rule: "[O]ne goal of a coordinated service delivery 
system is to create a fabric of seamless service. Seamless service means providing eligible parents access 
to and payment for child care services and programs which bridge and supplement the parents' child 
care needs, even as eligibility changes over time .... " 56 Fed. Reg. 26,200 (1991) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. § 98). 
Recognizing the possibility of state constitutional law questions, however, the final regulations include 
a provision that does not appear in the statute: "If a State law or constitution would prevent Federal 
Block Grant funds from being expended for the purposes provided in the Act, without limitation, then 
States must segregate State and Federal funds." 45 C.F.R. § 98.3(b) (1992). 
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expenditure of state funds for child care in violation of state constitutional 
provisions regarding the establishment of religiori. Other issues may arise 
under state law concerning states' voluntary participation in the CCDBG if 
such participation requires expenditures in violation of state constitutional 
principles. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CCDBG AID 
Although the CCDBG is the compromise product of conflicting social and 
constitutional views, the statute taken as a whole and properly interpreted 
embodies a coherent view of the Establishment Clause. Reflecting existing 
constitutional doctrines, it divides the universe of child care providers into 
two groups-nonsectarian and sectarian-one of which may be aided through 
state grants and contracts or through parent-held certificates, and one of which 
may be financially aided only through the device of certificates.92 The statute 
further expresses its view of the Establishment Clause by imposing restrictions 
on religious discrimination in admissions and employment.93 The statutory 
scheme is designed to ensure that there will be no constitutionally impermissi-
ble assistance given to sectarian institutions, while channeling substantial 
federal aid to religiously affiliated providers in ways that are consonant with 
Establishment Clause values.94 This Part argues that the CCDBG's grant and 
contract provisions are consistent with existing Establishment Clause law.9s 
However, the statute's voucher mechanism, although it may meet with the 
Supreme Court's approval,96 does undermine traditional Establishment Clause 
doctrines and the current church-and-state balance. 
A. The Meaning of the Statute's Provisions 
Before analyzing the constitutionality of the CCDBG, it is necessary to 
address two questions concerning its meaning: (1) whether the statute permits 
states to award grant and contract aid to sectarian child care programs to 
support their secular functions, and (2) whether all of the statute's employ-
ment discrimination rules apply to religiously affiliated programs. Proponents 
of a reinterpretation of the Establishment Clause that would allow unrestricted 
government aid to sectarian organizations have argued that Congress meant 
92. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text; infra notes 99-110, 124-40, 224-73 and 
accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text; infra notes 112-16, 264, 272-73 and 
accompanying text. 
94. See supra part II.B. 
95. But see Lee Boothby, The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment 
and Their Impact on National Child Care Legislation, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 549 (1989) (arguing that 
the Act for Better Child Care of 1987, which strictly prohibited the use of vouchers as well as grant and 
contract aid for sectarian activities, would nevertheless offend the Establishment Clause unless a number 
of very specific restrictions were added to the legislation). 
96. But see id. 
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to allow sectarian child care programs to receive direct government aid.97 
Some have also argued that Congress intended to exempt programs sponsored 
by sectarian organizations from certain of the statute's employment discrimi-
nation rules.98 Accepting such constructions of the statute would lead to an 
assessment of its constitutionality very different from the one presented here. 
The CCDBG provides that no financial assistance through grant or contract 
tuition subsidies may be "expended for any sectarian purpose or activity, 
including sectarian worship or instruction."99 The earliest introduced version 
of the legislation defined prohibited funding of "sectarian purposes or 
activities" to include the funding of any sectarian ''program or activity that 
has the purpose or effect of advancing or promoting a particular religion or 
religion generally."loo This interpretative language was later deleted from 
the bill, leaving only the general prohibition on funding sectarian purposes or 
activities, plus the words "including sectarian worship or instruction." The 
CCDBG contains the remaining language. The significance of the deletion of 
the interpretive language was the subject of some disagreement in Congress, 
but the legislative history strongly demonstrates that Congress never 
abandoned its intention to prohibit the payment of grant and contract aid to 
sectarian programs. lOl In addition, the CCDBG's statutory scheme as a 
97. E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Exchange; Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious 
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious 
Participation in Public Programs]; Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions 
and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REv. 989, 1025-28 (1991); see also John A. Liekweg, 
Participation of Religious Providers in Federal Child Care Legislation: Unrestricted Vouchers Are a 
Constitutional Alternative, 26 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 565, 568 (1989). 
98. See supra notes 74, 81-83 and infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9858k(a). The subsection states: 
No financial assistance provided under this subchapter [CCDBG], pursuant to the choice of a 
parent under section 9858c(c)(2)(A)(i)(l) of this title [grants and contracts under which the state 
pays tuition subsidies] or through any other grant or contract under the State plan, shall be 
expended for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or instruction. 
ld.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 98.54(d) (1992) ("Funds provided under grants or contracts to providers may 
not be expended for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or instruction."). 
According to the federal regulations, "sectarian purposes and activities means any religious purpose or 
activity, including but not limited to religious worship or instruction." 45 C.F.R. § 98.2(jj) (1992) 
(emphasis in original). 
100. H.R. 3660, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19(a)(I)-(2) (1987) (emphasis added). The bill stated: 
(1) GENERAL RULE.-No funds authorized by this Act shall be expended for sectarian 
purposes or activities. 
(2) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "sectarian purposes or activities" 
means-
(A) any program or activity that has the purpose or effect of advancing or promoting a 
particular religion or religion generally[.] 
ld. Section 19 also prohibited provision of services on the premises of a pervasively sectarian institution 
unless "all religious symbols and artifacts are covered or have been removed from such classroom or 
space," and prohibited provision of services by "persons who are otherwise employed as teachers or 
teachers' aides in a sectarian school." ld. at § 19(a)(2)(B). S. 1885, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 19(a)(I)-
(2), 19(a)(2)(B) (1987), contained identical language. 
101. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, in the section entitled "Additional and Minority Views[,]" which was 
appended to a later committee report, argued that the altered, more general prohibition did not prevent 
an entity receiving funds from including sectarian activities in its child care services. S. REp. No. 17, 
IOIst Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1989). "I believe that section 19(a) means what it says .... The langnage 
of this section should be applied in a manner consistent with, but not beyond, the constitutional 
restrictions of the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court[.]" ld. Even the dissenting 
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whole and other aspects of its legislative history plainly establish that 
views in the House Report concerning the altered language noted, however, that "conflicting 
interpretations of the legislative language have been made," but nevertheless agreed with the 
interpretation that "church-sponsored child care providers would not be eligible providers under the 
conditions of the bill unless they completely secularize their programs." H.R. REP. No. 985, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 31 (1988). 
According to the Senate Committee Report, the altered, more general language prohibits the receipt 
of grant and contract aid by a sectarian child care program: 
Under a narrow, technical interpretation of this prohibition, one could argue that sectarian 
activities are permitted in a child care program funded under this Act, so long as no financial 
assistance under this Act is used for the sectarian activities. The Committee expressly rejects 
such a narrow, technical interpretation of section 18(a). On the contrary, the Committee adopts 
a broad interpretation of the prohibition in section 18(a). Under the Committee's broad 
interpretation, an entity receiving any form of financial assistance under this Act shall not 
include any sectarian activities, worship or instruction in providing child care services under 
this Act. Section l8(a) embodies the Committee's intent that al/ aspects of child care services 
provided by an entity receiving financial assistance under this Act be completely non-sectarian 
in nature and in content. 
S. REp. No. 484, supra note 43, at 78 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 71 (including in a list of 
eligible providers, "churches and synagogues that offer nonsectarian services'); id. at 79 (prohibiting 
religious preferences from being "implemented in a manner which will undermine the intent of Congress 
that all funded programs be completely-nonsectarian'). The House Committee Report also referred to 
the intent of Congress "that all funded programs be nonsectarian in nature and in content." H.R. REp. 
No. 985, supra note 43, at 19. The report further explained: 
The Committee made certain language changes in Sections 19 and 20 of the original bill in 
order to simplify the provisions on the separation of church and state and nondiscrimination. 
It is the Committee's belief and intent that the language of the bill as reported by the 
subcommittee, although more general in form, embodies the important long-standing public 
policy and constitutional principles relating to the separation of church and state. 
Id. Dissenting views appended to the House Report unhappily agreed: "[I]t appears that church-
sponsored child care providers would not be eligible providers under the conditions of the bill unless 
they completely secularize their programs." Id. at 31. 
When similar legislation was introduced in the next Congress, with the same general prohibition, 
Congress again intended to allow funding only of nonsectarian programs. According to the Senate 
Committee's summary of the bill, "Non-sectarian church-based child care is fully eligible for assistance." 
S. REp. No. 17, supra note 74, at 26. Discussing the bill's general church-and-state limitation, the 
Committee stated that the section: 
[I]s intended to ensure that all child care programs receiving funds under this Act are 
nonsectarian, whether or not a sectarian institution operates the program .... [T]he Committee 
adopts a broad interpretation of the prohibition in section 19(a). Under the Committee's broad 
interpretation, an entity receiving any form of financial assistance under this Act shall not 
include any sectarian activities, worship or instruction in providing child care services under 
this Act. Section 19(a) embodies the Committee's intent that all aspects of child care services 
provided by an entity receiving financial assistance under this Act be completely non-sectarian 
• in nature and in content. 
Id. at 48-49. 
Congressional debates also reflected the view that the general prohibition prevented the payment of 
grant and contract aid to sectarian programs. The view was expressed in comments about a proposed 
amendment that included the general prohibition as well as the phrase that "[fjinancial assistance 
provided under such subtitle shall not be expended in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution of the 
United States." H. REp. 436, 10ist Cong., 2d Sess. at 15. Representative Eliot L. Engel noted: "This 
amendment would state explicitly that religious organizations can receive Federal funds for child care 
programs conducted on church property only if the program itself is nonsectarian." 136 CONGo REc. 
H1316 (daily ed. Mar. 29,1990) (statement of Rep. Engel). Representative Nita M. Lowey added: "But 
this amendment does not prevent a single synagogue or a single church from offering child care 
services. It simply states that those programs must be nonsectarian in nature if they use Federal funds." 
Id. at Hl3l7 (daily ed. Mar-. 29, 1990) (statement of Rep. Lowey). Representative Mel Levine stated: 
"The Edwards amendment would allow funds to go to sectarian institutions that provide nonsectarian 
care .... " Id. at H1319 (daily ed. Mar. 29,1990) (statement of Rep. Levine). 
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sectarian programs may not receive grant and contract funds. 
The Federal Government has been rather ambiguous on this dispute when 
issuing regulations to implement the CCDBG. The Department of Health and 
Human Services' regulations reiterate the statutory prohibition on funding 
sectarian purposes and activities,102 and they define as sectarian those 
providers that "engage[] in religious conduct or activity or that seek[] to 
maintain a religious identity in some or all of [their] functions."103 The 
supplementary information to the Department's final regulations states that 
"care provided under grant or contract may not include sectarian worship or 
instruction," but it also states that "nothing in the Act or regulation prevents 
a sectarian organization from using other funds, including funds from 
certificates, for sectarian activities."I04 On the one hand, the second 
statement could be interpreted to mean that a sectarian organization could 
simultaneously offer separate sectarian and nonsectarian programs. On the 
other hand, the statement could be a subtly expressed endorsement of the view 
that sectarian programs may receive grant and contract funds so long as they 
use those particular funds only for nonsectarian activities. 
The view that sectarian programs may receive grant and contract 'aid ignores 
a central feature of the statute's legislative history. As originally drafted, the 
statute's church-and-state provisions did not distinguish between recipients of 
grant and contract aid and recipients of child care certificates. Both forms of 
aid were made subject to the general prohibition that federal financial 
assistance could not be "expended for any sectarian purpose or activity."los 
102.45 C.F.R. § 98.54(d) (1992). 
103.45 C.F.R. § 98(ii)2 (1992). The regulation provides: 
Sectarian organization or sectarian child care provider means religious organizations or 
religious providers generally. The terms embrace any organization or provider that engages 
in religious conduct or activity or that seeks to maintain a religious identity in some or all of 
its functions. There is no requirement that a sectarian organization or provider be managed by 
clergy or have any particular degree of religious management, control, or content[.] 
[d. (emphasis removed and emphasis added). 
104. 57 Fed. Reg. 34,393 (1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 98). 
105. The earlier Senate bill, S. 1885, mandated that "[n]o financial assistance provided under this 
Act shall be expended for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship and instruction," 
S. 1885, supra note 43, § 19, and it permitted states to use grants and contracts or child care certificates 
or both. [d. § 8(a). (It did not include any provision permitting the use of vouchers for sectarian care.) 
The Senate committee report accompanying the bill stated that the legislation: 
prohibits an entity receiving any of the forms of financial assistance provided under this Act 
(e.g., grants, contracts, loans, or child care certificates) from using such assistance for any 
sectarian purpd-se or activity, including sectarian worship and instruction. This section is 
intended to ensure that all child care programs receiving funds under this Act are nonsectarian, 
whether or not a sectarian institution operates the program. 
S. REp. No. 484, supra note 43, at 78 (emphasis added). 
The Senate committee also noted that it wished "to clarify that it intends to subject federal fmancial 
assistance in the form of child care certificates to the same restrictions required for grants and loans 
provided under the Act" [d. at 80. 
The earlier House bill, H.R. 3660, mandated that "no funds authorized by this Act shall be expended 
for sectarian purposes or activities," H.R. 3660, supra note 43, § 19, and it permitted states to have 
grants and contracts or child care certificates or both. [d. § 8(a). (It did not include any provision 
permitting the use of vouchers for sectarian care.) The House committee report accompanying the 
legislation said, "The Committee •.. wants to emphasize that federal financial assistance in the form 
of child care certificates should receive the same legal treatment as grants and loans under this Act" 
H.R. REp. No. 985, supra note 43, at 12. 
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During the legislative process, after protracted debate, Congress added to the 
statute a specific provision allowing child care certificates to be expended for 
sectarian services: "Nothing in this [statute] shall preclude the use of ... 
certificates for sectarian child care services if freely chosen by the par-
ent."106 This legislative action is inexplicable if the statute's general 
prohibition on expending CCDBG funds for sectarian "purposes or activities" 
already allowed all fonns of aid-grant and contract aid and child care 
certificates-to be used for sectarian child care services. 
If the preexisting church-and-state provisions did not bar sectarian programs 
from receiving direct aid, then they also would not have barred sectarian 
programs from redeeming certificates. It would therefore not have been 
necessary to add a section granting pennission for sectarian providers to 
participate in the child care certificate scheme. The addition of the section 
pennitting participation in the voucher plan was motivated, in fact, by a desire 
to allow sectarian child care programs to benefit from the CCDBG. The use 
of the certificate mechanism for this purpose, rather than the use of direct 
grants and contracts, was seen as a constitutionally more palatable way to 
include them. 107 
106.42 U.S.C. § 9858n(2). 
107. For example, Senator Orrin G. Hatch said: 
Constitutional restrictions on direct public aid do not, I believe, apply to indirect aid such as 
the certificates in this Act even if pervasively religious organizations benefit The reason is that 
such. organizations receive such aid not as a result of governmental action, but rather as a result 
of an intervening choice by the primary recipient, in this case the parent. 
S. REp. No. 17, supra note 74, at 62 (accompanying S. 5) (Additional and Minority Views, Additional 
Views of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that the general prohibition on use of aid for religious purposes and 
activities should not be interpreted to prevent sectarian programs from receiving child care certificates). 
And Representative Nancy L. Johnson stated: 
[C]onstitutionally, I believe that the only way to get around the church-state issue is to mandate 
that parents have the right to a voucher and spend it with the provider they think best-just 
like they have a right to get food stamps and spend them in supermarkets or the comer store. 
Mr. Chairman, I attended a long seminar on the subject at Harvard, and the one thing the 
lawyers on each side of this debate agreed on was that certificates were the only legitimate way 
to allow public monies to be expended in religious day care. 
136 CONGo REe. H13l0 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Rep. Johnson). 
In addition, Representative Marilyn Lloyd stated: 
The voucher provisions contained in the Stenholm proposal, for low-income families to send 
their children to day care facilities in religious institutions, acknowledge that at least one-third 
of all child care in this county is provided by religious facilities. This language will firmly 
guarantee family choice and ensure the rights of many Americans who choose religious care 
as their best option for child care services. 
[d. at H1319 (daily eel. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Rep. Lloyd). 
In support of the amendment deleting language that would have exempted child care certificate 
recipients from church-and-state limitations, Representative William L. Clay said: 
Make no mistake, I want religious organizations to playa significant part in meeting the 
child care needs of working parents, even with Federal assistance. But as long as these centers 
are receiving Federal money, they must provide care which is appropriate for all families in 
their service areas. The Edwards amendment would create a child care proposal that would 
serve the public good-not specific religious purposes. Specifically, sectarian programs should 
gather their support from those who share the specific beliefs of the program. If religious 
centers want to discriminate, they should do so with their own money, not money that has been 
collected from all taxpayers. 
[d. (statement of Rep. Clay). 
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Furthennore, the view that sectarian programs may receive grant and 
contract aid-if such aid supports only secular activities-is inconsistent with 
the basic structure of the statute's funding scheme. The CCDBG's grant and 
contract aid is designed to subsidize a family's child care costs on a sliding 
fee scale. A state may pay up to one hundred percent of the child care costs 
for an eligible child. 108 The amount of aid a family receives depends on the 
family's income and the cost of the services the family uses. It does not 
depend in any way on the percentage of these charges that support secular 
activities or the cost of the secular activities themselves. In other words, grant 
and contract aid under the CCDBG is designed to subsidize a family's child 
care services generally rather than to fund only the secular activities of the 
program. 109 
In crafting church-and-state restrictions on these subsidies, Congress labored 
to satisfy the dictates of the Court's aid-to-religious-institutions cases. It 
recognized that general subsidies to sectarian programs violated existing 
doctrine, and therefore it limited grant and contract aid to programs without 
"any sectarian purpose or activity." This limitation is consistent with the 
fundamental principle, adhered to in all of the Supreme Court's aid-to-
religious-institutions cases, that government may not subsidize the overall 
operations of sectarian institutions because such subsidies amount to the 
public funding of religion.110 The idea that government may constitutionally 
provide general subsidies to sectarian organizations as a means of supporting 
their secular activities is contrary to the Court's traditional Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. If Congress had intended to adopt a theory so 
completely at odds with the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
surely Congress would have expressed itself more explicitly, rather than 
implying such a novel result only indirectly and ambiguously. 
Moreover, the CCDBG must be read as prohibiting the receipt of grant and 
contract aid by sectarian programs because the stahIte does not mandate 
safeguards for ensuring that sectarian programs use CCDBG funds only for 
secular functions. Indeed, neither the CCDBG nor the federal regulations 
require religiously affiliated programs to provide assurances that public funds 
are being used only for secular activities. Historically, such controls have 
been inherent or specifically included in aid schemes in which public funds 
flow to sectarian institutions. Every plan for providing direct aid to parochial 
schools that the Court has considered has featured such safeguards. 1I1 It is 
108. See supra note 50 and accompanying text 
109. The CCDBG's statutory scheme is significantly different in this respect from the adolescent 
pregnancy services statute scrutinized in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). While the Adolescent 
Family Life Act ("AFLA'') lacks the CCDBG's explicit prohibition on using funds for religious 
activities, the AFLA funds a specific set of secular social services, which is defined in the statute and 
which is subject to government monitoring. For a discussion of Bowen and the AFLA, see infra notes 
1I6-24 and accompanying text 
1I0. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text. 
III. The Supreme Court noted in one case, "[o]f course, under the relevant cases the outcome would 
likely be different were there no effective means for insuring that the cash reimbursement would cover 
only secular services ..•. But here ... the New York law provides ample safeguards against excessive 
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extremely unlikely that Congress would have authorized direct aid to sectarian 
child care programs without imposing any such controls. 
The second question concerning the meaning of the CCDBG-whether all 
of the statute's employment rules apply to religiously affiliated programs-can 
be resolved wholly by reference to the statute's plain language. The federal 
regulations erroneously state that programs, if they are operated by sectarian 
organizations and derive less than 80% of their funds from public sources, 
may require employees to adhere to the organization's religious tenets, and 
thus are exempt from the statute's prohibition on religious discrimination in 
hiring employees who work directly with children.1I2 The statutory provision 
at issue states that "a child care provider that receives assistance under this 
subchapter shall not discriminate in employment on the basis of the religion 
of the prospective employee if such employee's primary responsibility is or 
will be working directly with children in the provision of, child care 
services. "113 Nothing in this provision permits a reading that exempts certain 
types of providers-such as religiously affiliated providers-from its 
restrictions. Nor does any related provision of the statute accomplish this 
effect. 114 
or misdirected reimbursement" Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 
659 (1980) (citations omitted). Challenged programs have always been targeted, successfully or 
unsuccessfully in the Court's estimation, at specifically secular activities, and many programs have also 
included specific additional safeguards. See. e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (public school 
teachers providing secular educational services for educationally deprived children from low-income 
families); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (part-time public employees teaching 
supplemental classes in secular subjects after school, and full-time public employees offering 
supplemental classes in secular subjects during the regular school day); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 
229 (1977) (purchasing secular textbooks, supplying tests and scoring services used in public schools, 
providing speech and diagnostic hearing services and other services by public employees, supplying 
secular instructional materials of the kind used in public schools, and providing bus transportation for 
field trips); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (providing secular auxiliary services by public 
employees, secular instructional materials, and secular textbooks approved for use in public schools); 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (providing grants for 
maintenance and repair, tuition reimbursement, and tax relief calculated to cover only secular portions 
of educational services); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) 
(reimbursing private schools for testing expenses); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (providing 
a 15% salary supplement for teachers who teach only courses offered in public schools and who agree 
not to teach courses in religion, at schools in which per pupil expenditures on secular education are 
lower than at public schools); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loaning secular textbooks 
to public and private school students); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (subsidizing 
transportation to and from school). 
112. The regulations provide: "Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section [limiting religious 
discrimination in employment], a sectarian organization may require that employees adhere to the 
religious tenets and teachings of such organization and to rules forbidding the use of drugs or alcohol." 
45 C.F.R. § 98.47(b) (1992). 
113. 42 U.S.C. § 9858/{a){3){A). 
114. The section of the CCDBG that creates the admissions and employment discrimination rules 
begins with a declaration that "nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or affect the 
provisions of any other Federal law or regulation that relates to discrimination in employment on the 
basis of religion." [d. § 9858/{a){I)(A) (emphasis added). The section then proceeds to qualify this 
principle of construction, regarding other federal laws and regulations, by adding that "sectarian 
organization[s] may require that employees adhere to the religious tenets and teachings of such 
organization[s], and such organization[s] may require that employees adhere to rules forbidding the use 
of drugs or alcohol." [d. § 9858/(a)(I)(B). This qualification therefore protects sectarian organizations 
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Moreover, the provision at issue is followed by a qualifying provision that 
states: "If two or more prospective employees are qualified for [a] position 
... nothing ... shall prohibit [a] child care provider from employing a 
prospective employee who is already participating on a regular basis in other 
activities of the organization that owns or operates such provider. "IIS The 
provision obviously addresses situations in which prospective employees are 
given preference because of their association with a sponsoring church or 
other sectarian organization. Like the section this provision qualifies, it would 
be superfluous if it did not apply to programs operated by sectarian organiza-
tions. 1I6 
B. The Constitutionality of the Statute's Grant and Contract Aid 
The CCDBG's provisions regarding financial and in-kind aid do not on their 
face violate Establishment Clause proscriptions. The relevant test of the facial 
validity of these provisions is set out in Bowen v. Kendrick. 117 In Bowen, the 
Court reviewed the facial constitutionality of the Federal Adolescent Family 
Life ~ct ("AFLA"),1I8 a statute Congress enacted to address the problems 
caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood. The AFLA provides 
funding for "public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies 'for services 
and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and 
pregnancy,"119 and permits religiously affiliated organizations to receive 
funds. 120 The Act expressly recognizes that religious organizations play an 
important role in dealing with teenage sexuality and requires grant applicants 
to describe how they will, "'as appropriate in the provision of services[,] 
involve ... religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and 
other groups. ,"121 Despite these features, the Court concluded that the 
statute is neutral with respect to recipients' religious status. "[N]othing on the 
face of the Act suggests the AFLA is anything but neutral with respect to the 
grantee's status as a sectarian or purely secular institution,"122 and "nothing 
on the face of the [Act] indicates that a significant proportion of the federal 
funds will be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions[,]" in which 
from becoming subject to, simply by receiving CCDBG funds, any non-CCDBG federal restrictions on 
discrimination in employment on the basis of religion. Earlier versions of the legislation had specifically 
subjected recipients ofCCDBG funds to other federal anti-discrimination laws. See. e.g., S. 1885, supra 
note 43, § 20(c) (subjecting providers to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, "notwithstanding the exemption in section 703 of such Act" for religious organizations). The 
language of the principle of construction and its qualification do not exempt nonsectarian programs 
operated by religious groups from the CCDBG's limited employment discrimination restrictions. 
115.42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(3)(B). 
116. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing congressional efforts to distance the 
government from private actors' religious discrimination). 
117. Bowen, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
118.42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-300z-10 (1988). 
119. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593 (quoting S. REp. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981». 
120. Id. at 598. 
121. Id. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21) (Supp. III 1982». 
122. Id. at 608. 
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religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of the institutions' functions 
are subsumed in their religious missions.123 
Under the Court's decision in Bowen, the CCDBG's grant and contract 
provisions would withstand facial constitutional scrutiny. These provisions are 
neutral with respect to recipients' religious status, and they do not indicate 
that a significant proportion offederal funds will flow to pervasively sectarian 
institutions. 124 In addition, the case for the facial validity of CCDBG grant 
and contract aid is even stronger than the case was for the AFLA. Unlike the 
AFLA, the CCDBG does not mandate the involvement of religious institu-
tions. The CCDBG also includes specific Establishment Clause safeguards that 
are absent in the AFLA.125 
The constitutional question raised by the grant and contract provisions, 
therefore, is whether, as applied, they will offend the Establishment 
Clause. 126 The analysis depends on whether these provisions in practice 
result in the distribution of governmental assistance in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. As argued above, the CCDBG forbids grant and 
contract aid to sectarian programs. Without this prohibition, the law would 
violate constitutional mandates because the Court has consistently held that 
government aid may not be used for general subsidies to pervasively sectarian 
institutions. For example, in parochial school aid cases, the Court has always 
maintained that unrestricted financial assistance for the educational functions 
of "pervasively sectarian" schools violates the Establishment Clause. Such aid 
subsidizes a parochial school's religious mission because this mission is 
inseparable from its secular activities. 127 The Court has consistently 
characterized such aid as contrary to the constitutional prohibition against 
"government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs 
of a particular religious faith."128 Under the Court's precedents, pervasively 
sectarian schools may receive only very specific, very limited forms of aid 
that do not subsidize their basic educational missions. 129 
The Establishment Clause ideal of separation between church and state that 
underlies the prohibition on unrestricted financial aid.to sectarian institutions 
was expressed in 1947 in the vivid rhetoric of. Everson v. Board of 
123. [d. at 610. , 
124. The statutory definition of "eligible child care provider" includes all public, private not-for-
profit, and private for-profit providers. 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(5). Non-sectarian but religiously affiliated 
programs may receive all forms of CCDBG aid, and sectarian programs may receive child care 
certificates. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. But nothing on the face of the statute indicates 
that a significant percentage of the CCDBG's aid will flow to pervasively sectarian institutions. 
125. See supra notes 64-66, 73-86 and accompanying text; infra notes 251-52 and accompanying 
text. . 
126. Challenges may arise when a provider that has been denied CCDBG funding brings an 
administrative complaint against a state to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources, 42 
U.S.C. § 9858g(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 98.93 (1992), or when a taxpayer brings a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
127. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. 
128. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (citing, among other things, earlier 
parochial school cases); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 6II, 623 (1988). 
129. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text. 
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Education. 13o While Everson in fact permitted a very limited form of 
aid-reimbursing parents for the expense of transporting their children to and 
from parochial schools-the decision fashioned a veritable verbal icon of 
church-and-state relations: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person 
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion .... No tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions . ... In the words ofJefferson, the clause against establishment 
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between 
church and State."131 
The Court has affirmed this prohibition on direct unrestricted governmental 
aid in cases involving public funding of social services provided by sectarian 
organizations. In Bradfield v. Roberts, the Court considered the propriety 
under the Establishment Clause of government contracts with a religiously 
affiliated hospital in the District of Columbia.132 The Court approved the 
government's pursuit of secular goals through contracts with the hospital 
because the institution by its charter and in its operation was a "secular 
corporation" pursuing '''the specific and limited object of' ... opening and 
keeping a hospital in the city of Washington for the care of ... sick and 
invalid persons."133 Noting that no allegation had been made that the 
hospital's "work [was] confined to members of that church" or that the 
hospital had violated the secular purposes of its charter, the Court was not 
concerned that the hospital might be managed by members of the Catholic 
faith. 134 
More recently, in Bowen, a 1988 case, the Court took a similar approach. 
The Court upheld the statute on its face because the law did not mandate or 
suggest that a significant percentage of the federal funds for social services 
would be disbursed to pervasively sectarian institutions. The opinion 
concluded by directing the trial court on remand to consider (1) whether aid 
"is flowing to grantees that can be considered 'pervasively sectarian' religious 
institutions, such as we have held parochial schools to be," and (2) whether 
"in particular cases . . . aid has been used to fund 'specifically religious 
activit[ies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting.'''135 
In its church-and-state jurisprudence, the Court has used the term "perva-
sively sectarian" to denominate organizations in which sectarian purposes and 
activities pervade and are inseparable from the organization~' secular 
130. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
131. [d. at 15-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
132. Bradfield, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
133. [d. at 298-99. 
134. [d. 
135. Bowen, 487 U.S. 589, 621 (1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 
734, 743 (1973». 
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functions. Thus, the Court has treated parochial elementary and secondary 
schools as "pervasively sectarian" because their religious mission is 
intertwined with and subordinate to the school's secular purposes.136 While 
the Court has been somewhat vague about the evidence that demonstrates this 
feature of parochial schools, it has found the following facts to be significant: 
that a school has an express statement of religious purposes, is run by and 
receives money from a church, grants preferences in admissions to members 
of its denomination, has a faculty and student body composed largely of 
adherents, and includes prayer and attendance at services as part of the school 
program. 137 On the other hand, in its cases involving religiously affiliated 
institutions of higher education, the Court has declined to conclude that these 
institutions were pervasively sectarian, relying principally on the fact that they 
did not make religious indoctrination a substantial purpose or activity.138 
The Court also found it significant that non-adherents could be admitted and 
hired to teach and that the proportion of adherents in an institution's student 
body was no greater than in the surrounding area. 139 
The CCDBG ensures that grants and contracts for child care services will 
not be awarded to programs that are "pervasively sectarian" under the Court's 
precedents. Although grant and contract recipient programs may share some 
features with the parochial schools examined by the Court, they are barred 
from receiving grant and contract aid if they have "any sectarian purpose or 
activit[ies]" at all. 140 
While the CCDBG forbids pervasively sectarian programs from receiving 
grant and contract aid-aid that would generally subsidize their overall 
operations-it permits the receipt of such aid by nonsectarian programs that 
are owned or operated by pervasively sectarian organizations. Thus, a child 
care program that does not have sectarian purposes or engage in sectarian 
activities but is owned or operated by a church or parochial school may 
receive grant and contract aid. There remain substantial questions about the 
conditions under which it is constitutionally permissible and desirable for 
these religiously affiliated programs to receive such aid. 141 The CCDBG's 
136. See, e.g.,Id. at 609-10 (quoting Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373, 384 (1985). 
137. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985); Ball, 473 U.S. at 379, 384; Wolman v. Walter, 
433 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 
825,830 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 476 (1973); 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,3 (1947). 
138. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-59 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt, 413 
U.S. at 743-44 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
139. The Court in Hunt stated: . 
What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious 
qualifications for faculty membership or student admission, and that only 60% of the College 
student body is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that 
area of South Carolina. On the record in this case there is no basis to conclude that the 
College's operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education. 
Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743-44 (citation omitted). 
140. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
141. A range of views was reflected in the different versions of this legislation, see, e.g., supra notes 
66, 79 and accompanying text, and by different interest groups involved in the legislative process. For 
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church-and-state provIsIons are addressed to this concern and represent a 
congressional endeavor to confonn the grant and contract aid provisions to 
constitutional dictates. The question is whether Congress has succeeded in its 
effort. 
To answer this question, one must turn to the Court's Lemon test. 142 
Despite commentators' criticisms of this test, and the Court's own self-
doubts143 and modified emphases in applying it,l44 this three-part "sign-
post"14S or "guideline"146 is still the starting point for Establishment 
Clause analyses in the area of government aid to religious institutions.147 
example, the American Civil Liberties Union enunciated a list of strict restrictions that it believed to be 
necessary: 
Religious facilities sometimes house services like daycare ... for the general public. Is it 
constitutional for these programs to receive government funds? ••. [G]overnment funding of 
public child care programs located in religious institutions is constitutional only if the 
following conditions are met: 1) The program must be supervised and run by a non-religious 
group; 2) the non-religious group must hire staff who have no association with the religious 
facility housing the program; 3) the program must have no religious content; 4) no religious 
symbols can be displayed in the vicinity of the program; 5) the program must admit children 
on a non-discriminatory basis, without regard to their religion[;] and 6) the government can pay 
only rent to the religious facility. 
ACLU Briefing Paper No.3 (undated) (copy on file with the author). 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State expressed a similarly restrictive view that 
"federal funds should not and cannot be used to assist church-affiliated day care programs." The Actfor 
Better Child Care Services: Summary of a Church-State Analysis 1 (undated paper released by the 
organization during the legislative process) (copy on file with the author). The organization argued that 
the only way to make legislation sound would be to exclude churches and other sectarian organizations 
as recipients of these funds or institute the following limitations on any church-related child care center: 
1. Establish a separate corporation to govern the child care center[;] 
2. Hire separate teaching and support staffs; 
3. Move the child care center off church premises[;] 
4. Conduct admissions and hiring on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
Id. at 6. 
142. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
143. See infra notes 144-45, 147, 191-92,314 and accompanying text. 
144. See infra notes 218-20, 314 and accompanying text. 
145. In Hunt, the Supreme Court said: "With full recognition that these are no more than helpful 
signposts, we consider the present statute and the proposed transaction in terms of the three 'tests': 
purpose, effect, and entanglement." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). 
146. In Tilton, Justice Burger explained: 
Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the absolutes of the physical sciences or 
mathematics. The standards should rather be viewed as guidelines with which to identify 
instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses have been impaired. And, as we have 
noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman and Earley v. DiCenso, 0 candor compels the acknowledgment 
that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this 
sensitive area of constitutional adjudication. 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (citations omitted). 
147. Justice Blackmun reported in his concurrence in the recent Lee v. Weisman graduation prayer 
case that, "[s]ince 1971, the Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one instance ..• 
has the Court not rested its decision on the basic principles described in Lemon." Lee v. Weisman, 112 
S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992). 
A majority of the Court declined to reconsider the Lemon test in Lee. Id. at 2655. 
This case does not require us to revisit the difficult questions dividing us in recent cases, 
questions of the definition and full scope of the principles governing the extent of permitted 
accommodation by the State for the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens ...• 
Thus we do not accept the invitation of the petitioners and amicus the United States to 
reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 
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The Lemon test requires a court to ask whether a governmental action lacks 
a secular purpose,148 causes an excessive entanglement between government 
and religion, or has a primary effect of advancing religion. 149 The action at 
issue fails the test-and is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause-if 
the answer to any of these questions is affirmative. 
1. Whether the Program Lacks a Secular Purpose 
In considering the first question posed by the Lemon test, the Court has 
found a secular purpose when the challenged action furthers public goals, such 
as providing health care to the poor or improving education, and does not 
single out religion for preferential treatment. This part of the test has not been 
a significant hurdle when government programs involving social services and 
education have distributed funds non-preferentially among secular and 
sectarian organizations. In such cases, including the ones involving aid to 
parochial schools, the Court has always discerned a secular purpose behind 
the government's largesse. ISO Indeed, the only time that the Court has 
invalidated a scheme of aid to religious institutions because of a lack of a 
secular purpose involved a tax measure that singled out religion for preferen-
tial treatment. lSI The CCDBG has the secular purposes of assisting families 
with child care costs and improving the child care system, and it does not 
single out religious providers for preferential treatment. Under the Court's 
precedents, the CCDBG would undoubtedly pass the first part of the test. 
2. Whether the Program Creates Excessive Entanglement 
Under the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, the Court examines 
whether the government action at issue leads to excessively intimate 
relationships between church and state. There is no bright line test for 
/d. (citations omitted). Justice Scalia, an advocate of abolishing Lemon, suggested that the Court had 
effectively rejected it: "The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring 
it ... and the interment of that case may be the one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise 
lamentable decision." Id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
More recently, however, in the aid-to-religious-institutions case ofZobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), a majority of the Court again chose not to abandon the Lemon test. See 
also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2148 (1993) (applying 
the Lemon test in a challenge by a church to a school district's refusal to allow the church to use school 
facilities to show film series on child-rearing). 
148. In Bowen, the Court emphasized that the challenged statute did not lack a secular purpose. "The 
District Court ... reason[ed] that even if it is assumed that the AFLA was motivated in part by 
improper concerns, the parts of the statute ... were also motivated by other, entirely legitimate secular 
concerns." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603 (1988). 
149. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-23 (1971). 
ISO. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,383 (1985) ("As has often been true 
in school aid cases, there is not dispute as to the first test."); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). 
151. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); see also infra notes 284-85 and 
accompanying text. 
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determining when government and religious institutions have become too 
closely entangled, but two considerations are crucial. The Court seeks to 
prevent both an identification of government with religion and the intrusion 
of government into the affairs of religious institutions. 
When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters 
of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief . . . suffers, even 
when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely 
secular. . . . "[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both 
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere."ls2 
With respect to tax measures, entanglement issues are raised when religious 
institutions enjoy exemptions, and when they are subject to levies because in 
either case it may be necessary for the government to investigate the religious 
institutions' affairs in order to administer the tax scheme. Because some 
degree of entanglement is therefore inevitable, and because historically the 
contacts necessitated by such tax measures have not threatened Establishment 
Clause values, the Court has not found excessive entanglement in either 
instance. IS3 The Court has been more troubled by the possibility of 
excessive entanglement in programs that disburse government aid to religious 
institutions, especially when the recipient institutions are pervasively 
sectarian. IS4 Such aid programs by their very nature require more extensive 
administrative contacts between church and state. The State must review 
applications, monitor performance, and implement safeguards to ensure that 
public funds are not spent for religious purposes. 
Thus, in the 1985 case of Aguilar v. Felton, the Court invalidated on 
entanglement grounds New York City's provision of federally funded Title I 
remedial education services on the premises of private schools, ISS more than 
90% of which were parochial schools. IS6 The services were provided by 
public school employees who were sent into parochial schools. The program 
included safeguards to ensure that public funds were not used to advance 
religion. IS7 Justice Brennan wrote for the majority that the case involved 
"critical elements" of proscribed entanglement-provision of aid in a 
pervasively sectarian environment and in a form that requires "ongoing 
inspection."lss The Court found that "the detailed monitoring and _close 
administrative contact required to maintain New York City's Title I program 
can only produce 'a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the 
[First Amendment's] policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.'''ls9 
152. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
153. See infra notes 277-89 and accompanying text. 
154. E.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. 409-14; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 254; Meek, 421 U.S. at 370 (1975); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-22 (1971). 
ISS. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14. 
156. ld. at 406. 
157.ld. at 406-07. 
158.ld. at 412. 
159.ld. at 414 (citation omitted). 
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The provision of CCDBG grant and contract aid to child care programs 
owned or operated by pervasively sectarian institutions raises similar 
entanglement issues, but they are mitigated by other circumstances. The 
CCDBG, like the program 'invalidated in Aguilar, allows aid to flow to 
pervasively sectarian organizations. In order to ensure that the funds are not 
used to advance religion, activities of administrators and staff members who 
provide child care services will require monitoring, although neither the 
statute nor the regulations prescribe mechanisms for the states to perform such 
monitoring. However, the child care activities funded by the CCDBG are more 
separate from the sponsoring organizations' sectarian activities than the 
educational programs at issue in Aguilar. And in sharp contrast to the 
situation in Aguilar, only a minority of private providers will be religiously 
affiliated. 
The remedial instruction in Aguilar was part of the parochial schools' 
educational endeavors, which the Court considered inextricably intertwined 
with their religious mission. 160 Child care services funded under the CCDBG 
must be distinct from the sectarian activities of sponsoring organizations. The 
child care services sponsored by a parochial school will be farther removed 
from the school's regular elementary education program than the Title I 
remedial instruction program invalidated in Aguilar. The CCDBG, moreover, 
specifically forbids the expenditure of funds for "any instructional services 
which supplant or duplicate the program of any public or private school."161 
And in cases in which the sponsoring organization neither is, nor operates, a 
parochial school, the connection between CCDBG-funded services and the 
sectarian activities of the sponsoring organization is likely to be still more 
attenuated than the connection that troubled the Court in Aguilar. 
Furthermore, in Aguilar, more than 90% of the aided institutions were 
parochial schools. Given the current child care landscape, a minority of 
CCDBG grant and contract recipients are likely to have any degree of 
affiliation with a pervasively sectarian institution. 162 Because of these 
differences, there is much less danger that the administrative contacts required 
by the CCDBG wiIllead to an identification between government and religion 
or to intrusions into the religious activities of pervasively sectarian sponsoring 
organizations. And the danger is so much less that the statute's grant and 
contract provisions should pass the entanglement part of the Lemon test under 
the Court's existing case law. 
160. [d. at 412. 
161. 42 U.S.C. § 9858k(b). The subsection provides: 
(b) Tuition 
With regard to services provided to students enrolled in grades 1 through 12, no financial 
assistance provided under this subchapter shall be expended for-
(1) any services provided to such students during the regular school day; 
(2) any services for which such students receive academic credit toward graduation; or 
(3) any instructional services which supplant or duplicate the academic program of any 
public or private school. 
162. See supra notes 22, 25-27. 
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In any event, the vitality of the entanglement test itself has become 
increasingly doubtful in the face of a critical assault by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. Chief Justice Rehnquist has likened the test to a "'Catch-22' 
paradox."163 In his view, the Lemon test results in an otherwise constitution-
al program failing to pass constitutional muster simply because the govern-
ment establishes safeguards to ensure that aid is not misused for religious 
purposes. 164 In dissenting opinions in Aguilar, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O'Connor rejected the doctrinal underpinnings of the excessive 
entanglement test, arguing that a program should not be invalidated under the 
Establishment Clause merely because it includes state supervision designed 
to ensure that government funds are not used to advance religion.165 This 
view seems to be in a period of ascendance on the Court. In Bowen, the 
majority opinion reiterated (in dicta) this criticism of the entanglement 
test. 166 That expression of dissatisfaction by a majority of the Court, as well 
as the departure from the Court of those justices who have been most 
sensitive to entanglement issues,167 suggests that entanglement will not be 
significant in future cases. Any judicial relaxation of this part of the Lemon 
test should eliminate the possibility that the CCDBG will be found unconstitu-
tional on entanglement grounds. 
3. Whether the Program Has the Primary Effect of 
Advancing Religion 
The remammg Lemon inquiry is whether a government action has a 
"primary" effect of advancing religion. In undertaking this inquiry, the Court 
has recognized that any government aid to a religious institution, however 
narrowly restricted, benefits the recipient's religious aims. 168 Nevertheless, 
the Court has allowed some types of aid. As the Court said of the aid 
approved in Everson v. Board of Education, for example, "payment of bus 
fares was of some value to the religious school, but was nevertheless not such 
support of a religious institution as to be a prohibited establishment of 
religion .... "169 The Court has held that aid does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause if the benefit it confers on religion is sufficiently slight or 
"indirect." Where the benefit to religion is more substantial-"direct" in the 
lexicon oft the cases-the aid is impermissible. 170 
163. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
164. ld. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
165.ld. at 420-21,427-30 (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J., respectively, dissenting). 
166. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988). 
167. Of the majority that invalidated a school aid program on entanglement grounds in Aguilar, 473 
U.S. at 403, only Justices Stevens and Blackmun remain and they are all who remain of the minority 
that dissented in Bowen, 487 U.S. at 625. 
168. See. e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973). 
169. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968). 
170. E.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) (distinguishing 
"direct aid" from "attenuated" benefit to "incidental" beneficiary); Ball, 473 U.S. at 393 (explaining that 
the Court has distinguished between "indirect aid cases" and cases in which there is "direct and 
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A minority of justices have rejected this lipe-drawing exercise altogether. 
Retired Justice White consistently expressed the view that it is irrelevant 
because even government aid that benefits religion does not violate the 
Establishment Clause if it has a secular purpose and effect. Justice White has 
said that if government wants to pursue the secular purpose of promoting 
private school education by funding the secular functions of parochial schools, 
it is of no constitutional consequence that the aid also benefits the schools' 
inseparable sectarian functions.171 "That religion and private interest other 
than education may substantially benefit does not convert these laws into 
impermissible establishments of religion."172 
Although Justice Stevens joined the Court's line-drawing approach in Grand 
Rapids' School District v. Ball,173 he had previously dismissed such an 
analysis on the ground that any program of educational assistance to parochial 
schools unconstitutionally advances religion. "[A] state subsidy of sectarian 
schools is invalid regardless of the form it takes. The financing of buildings, 
field trips, instructional materials, educational tests, and schoolbooks are all 
equally invalid. For all give aid to the school's educational mission, which at 
heart is religious."174 This view is, essentially, an economically logical "aid-
to-the-enterprise theory,"175 under which any aid to secular functions of a 
pervasively sectarian institution constitutes impermissible aid to religion. 
The Court, rejecting both of these minority views, continues to undertake 
the line-drawing exercise, as evidenced by the recent decision in Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District. 176 In a series of parochial school aid 
substantial" aid); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658 (1980) 
(explaining that the Court has never invalidated payments on the ground that aid to one aspect of an 
institution frees it to spend resources on its religious purposes); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359, 
364-65 (1975) (distinguishing "indirect and incidental" benefits from "substantial" support); Nyquist, 
413 U.S. at 775 (1973) (distinguishmg aid that has an "indirect and incidental effect beneficial to 
religious institutions" from "direct aid to the sectarian" aspects of the institution). 
171. During his years on the bench, Justice White expressed general support for government aid to 
parochial schools. In his Nyquist dissent, he wrote: 
Positing an obligation on the State to educate its children, which every State acknowledges, 
it should be wholly acceptable for the State to contribute to the secular education of children 
going to sectarian schools rather than to insist that if parents want to provide their children 
with religious as well as secular education, the State will refuse to contribute anything to their 
secular training. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 814-15; see also. e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 664 (1971) (White, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
172. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 664 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
173. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,374 (1985). 
(;1 174. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (footnotes omitted); see also Regan, 444 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also 
expressed a similar view, arguing that all educational assistance, as opposed to general welfare 
programs, should be invalid. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Also like Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall jo4Jed the majority's analysis in Ball, which 
distinguishes between direct and indirect aid. See also Regan, 444 U.S. at 662 (1980) (Justice Marshall 
joining Justice Blackmun's dissent that distinguished between direct and indirect aid). 
175. Professors Nowak, Rotunda, and Young use this phrase to describe the grounds on which the 
Court invalidated the loan of instructional materials in Meek. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONsnnmONAL 
LAW 1173 (4th ed. 1991). 
176. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). 
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cases, the Court engaged in this exercise and approved programs that aid 
parochial schools by funding bus fares to and from school;177 loaning 
students secular textbooks approved by state officials;178 providing diagnos-
tic speech and hearing services and diagnostic psychological services;179 
offering off-site therapeutic and remedial services; 180 supplying standardized 
tests and scoring services for state-prepared examinations;181 reimbursing the 
costs of administering state-prepared tests; 182 and providing a sign language 
interpreter for a deaf student.183 On the other hand, it has invalidated 
programs that gave teachers salary supplements to conduct secular cours-
es;184 "purchased" secular educational services by reimbursing schools for 
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials;18S funded adminis-
tration of tests prepared by parochial schoolteachers; 186 awarded mainte-
nance and repair grants; 187 loaned instructional materials and equipment; 188 
furnished educational services such as counseling;189 and provided field trip 
transportation. 190 
Despite its commitment to the line-drawing task, the Court has found it a 
difficult one in practice. The Court has expressed doubts about the doctrinal 
integrity of its collage of cases in which the line between permissible and 
impermissible aid has often seemed dim and indistinct. 191 Commentators 
also have questioned the logic of the distinctions made in these cases. 192 
177. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
178. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
179. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
l80.Id. 
181. [d. 
182. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
183. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 113 S. Ct 2462 (1.993). 
184. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
185. [d. 
186. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
187. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
188. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
189. [d. 
190. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
191. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) ("tests 'must not be viewed 
as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with 
which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired''') 
(quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 359); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) ("in many of these 
decisions we have expressly or implicitly acknowledged that 'we can only dimly perceive the lines of 
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law''') (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602,612 (1971»; Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 
(1980) ("[N]ot to say that this case, any more than past cases, will furnish a litmus paper test to 
distinguish permissible from impermissible aid to religiously oriented schools'); Hunt v. McNair, 413 
U.S. 663, 741 (1973) (the principles "are no more than helpful signposts'); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("[A]nalysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment that 
there is no single constitutional caliper that can be' used to measure the precise degree" to which 
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement are present). 
192. Citing a number of articles, Justice Scalia opined in his concurrence in the recent case of 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 113 S. Ct 2141 (1993): "I agree with the 
long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment 
Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced." [d. at 2150 
(citations omitted). 
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One scholar has opined, "Because the parochial aid cases are so inconsistent, 
they do not suggest any overall perspective other than rejection of both the 
separationist and accommodationist alternatives."193 While it is true that the 
line between permissible and impermissible assistance is malleable and that 
on occasion the Court has subordinated its logic to its precedents,194 the 
Court has nonetheless fashioned a workable analytical framework for 
developing in a common law fashion an evolving boundary between 
constitutional and unconstitutional aid. The fashioning and application of this 
framework has enabled it to promote Establishment Clause values while 
simultaneously balancing them with other social and political goals. Adopting 
either Justice White's or Justice Stevens' view would spare the Court from 
criticisms that its attempts to distinguish between permissible and impermissi-
ble aid are incoherent and unprincipled, but doing so would disable the Court 
from creating a doctrinal and political compromise under which it can allow 
some aid while nevertheless affirming the ideal that government must not fund 
religious activities. 
The Court's analytical framework for deciding whether aid has a primary 
effect of advancing religion involves a three-part process. Aid is determined 
to be impermissible if it (1) directly promotes "religion by ... providing a 
subsidy to the primary religious mission" of the institution,195 (2) creates a 
substantial risk that government funds will be used for the inculcation of 
religion,196 or (3) creates a symbolic link between government and reli-
gion. 197 The decision in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball elaboraCes this 
framework198 and exemplifies how the Court applies it to a challenged 
program of assistance. In Ball, the Court invalidated the Grand Rapids, 
193. Marshall, supra note 18, at 547. Marshall argues that "a symbolic understanding of 
establishment may appropriately provide a cohesive framework under which establishment jurisprudence 
may be remodeled." [d. at 498. But see Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the 
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113 (1988). 
The Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine ... has achieved a national resolution of 
church-state issues far superior to that which would prevail in its absence. In large part, this 
is due to institutional characteristics permitting the Court to make decisions that are politically 
and morally superior to the decisions reached by the majoritarian process. 
[d. at 1193. See generally infra note 314. 
194. In Wolman, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court noted the inconsistency of its approval of textbook 
loans in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), with its subsequent disapprovals of similar 
material. 
Board of Education v. Allen has remained law, and we now follow as a matter of stare decisis 
the principle that restriction of textbooks to those provided the public schools is sufficient to 
ensure that the books will not be used for religious purposes. In more recent cases, however, 
we have declined to extend that presumption of neutrality to other items in the lower school 
setting. It has been argued that the Court should extend Allen to cover all items similar to 
textbooks. When faced, however, with a choice between extension of the unique presumption 
created in Allen and continued adherence to the principles announced in our subsequent cases, 
we choose the latter course. 
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252 n.18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
195. Grand Rapids Sch. Dis!. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-85 (1985). 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
198. The Court recently failed to take advantage of an opportunity to reject this framework in Zobrest 
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2642, 2466-68 (1993). 
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Michigan, school district's "Community Education" program,199 under which 
the school district provided instructional materials for and hired schoolteach-
ers to teach after-school courses in the private schools in which they were 
employed during the day.20o The courses-arts and crafts, Spanish, drama, 
and humanities, for example201-were ones that were "otherwise available 
at the public school, usually as part of [the public school's] more extensive 
regular curriculum."202 The Court described forty of the forty-one benefited 
private schools as religious institutions similar to "the sectarian schools that 
have been the subject of our past cases-'the secular education those schools 
provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason 
for the schools' existence. Within that institution, the two are inextricably 
intertwined. ,"203 The Community Education classes themselves were "largely 
composed of students who [were] adherents of the same denomination. "204 
The Court found that this in-kind aid to pervasively sectarian schools had 
a "primary effect" of advancing religion, in the same fashion as unrestricted 
financial aid.20s The Court likened the provision of instructional materials 
and teachers to the loans of instructional materials it had invalidated in earlier 
caSeS.206 The aid program made "no endeavor 'to guarantee the separation 
between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State 
financial aid supports only the former. ,"207 Because it provided teachers as 
well as teaching materials, the Court considered it to be even more substantial 
assistance to sectarian educational enterprises.208 The Court rejected the 
argument that the courses merely "supplemented" the schools' curricula and 
concluded that the consequence of accepting such an argument would be "to 
permit ever larger segments of the religious school curriculum to be turned 
over to the public school system."209 . 
In addition to finding that the Community Education program advanced 
religion, the Court found, and placed by far its greatest emphasis on the fact, 
that the program created a substantial risk of government-funded inculcation 
199. The text concentrates on the Ball analysis of the Community Education program because it is 
the most recent and the most fully articulated example of the Court's application of the second part of 
the Lemon test in a parochial school aid case. The Ball analysis of the Community Education program 
is also a particularly useful tool for evaluating various provisions of the CCDBG. Ball also involved and 
invalidated the Shared Time program, under which full-time employees of the public schools taught 
classes during the school day in non-pUblic school, classes "intended to be supplementary to the 'core 
curriculum' courses that" the state required as part of an accredited school program." Ball, 473 U.S. at 
375. 
200. [d. at 377. 
201. [d. at 376. 
202. [d. at 377. 
203.Id. at 384 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971». 
204. [d. at 391. 
205. [d. at 393-97. 
206. [d. at 395. 
207. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971»). 
208. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395-96. 
209. [d. at 397. 
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of religion.2lO The classes funded by the program were "largely composed 
of students who [we]re adherents of the same denomination."211 Virtually 
every one of the Community Education instructors taught in the same school 
during the day, and many of them probably taught in those schools out of a 
desire to serve their religious denomination. During the regular school day, 
these teachers were expected to inculcate their students with religion, but 
immediately after school, with the same students and in the same classrooms, 
they were required to engage in purely secular education. Not questioning the 
teachers' good faith attempts to achieve this transformation, the Court found 
a substantial risk that the expectations of the school day would "infuse" the 
after-school classes.212 
In contrast to these assessments of the Community Education program in 
Ball, when the Court in Zobrest examined the constitutionality of providing 
a sign-language interpreter to a deaf parochial school student, the five-member 
majority sharply distinguished such aid from direct, unrestricted financial aid 
to the educational functions of a parochial school: 
[T]he programs in Meek and Ball-through direct grants of government 
aid-relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne 
in educating their students .... "This kind of direct aid," we determined, 
"is indistinguishable from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the 
religious school .... " The extension of aid to petitioners, however, does 
not amount to "an impermissible 'direct subsidy'" of Salpointe .... For 
Salpointe is not relieved of an expense that it otherwise would have 
assumed in educating its students.213 
In addition, whereas the public aid invalidated in Ball primarily flowed to and 
benefited parochial schools, the Court found that the federal and state program 
at issue in Zobrest only incidentally benefited sectarian schools.214 The 
function of the federal program in Zobrest "[wa]s hardly 'to provide desired 
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.'''21s Finally, the 
Zobrest majority was untroubled that the case involved placing a public 
employee in a pervasively sectarian setting because an interpreter, unlike a 
teacher, merely translates the material presented to the class and in the 
process "neither add[s] to nor subtract[s] from that environment."216 
210.Id. at 385-87. 
211. Id. at 391. 
212.Id. at 386-87. 
213. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2468-69 (1993) (citations omitted). 
214.Id. at 2469. 
215. [d. (citation omitted). 
216. [d. at 2469. The Zobrest dissenters who discussed the constitutional issue, which they believed 
the Court should not have reached, vehemently disagreed with the point at which the majority drew the 
line between permissible and impermissible aid to a pervasively sectarian institution. Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justice Souter, viewed the provision of an interpreter not only as a "conduit" for a parochial 
school's education, and thus a form of assistance for the school's "mission of religious indoctrination," 
but also as a "graphic symbol of the concert of church and state" that may support and place an 
"imprimatur of governmental approval" upon the denomination operating the school. [d. at 2469 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, all of the justices who addressed the constitutional issue adhered 
to the established notions that the government may not directly subsidize religious activity and that lines 
must be drawn between permissible and impermissible aid. 
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The third question in assessing whether aid advances religion, the question 
of whether the aid creates a symbolic link between government and religion, 
was not reached or discussed by the majority in Zobrest. In Ball, however, the 
Court addressed this question and found that the Community Education 
program created a symbolic link between government and religion that 
conveyed an endorsement of religion. "[A]n important concern of the effects 
test is whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the 
challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by 
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the 
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices."217 
This explication in Ball echoed and adverted218 to the gloss upon, or 
modification of, the Lemon test advanced by Justice O'Connor in a case 
challenging a public holiday display that included a creche and a Christmas 
tree among other objects.219 In her view of the test, its "effects" prong turns 
on whether the government practice communicates "endorsement" of religion, 
which in turn sends a "message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community .... "220 
The Ball opinion characterized the existence of a symbolic link as 
particularly problematic in situations involving "children of tender years, 
whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function 
of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice."221 Similarly, with 
respect to the endorsement concept, Justice O'Connor notes elsewhere the 
special significance of situations in which "government-sponsored religious 
exercises are directed at impressionable children who are required to attend 
school, for then government endorsement is much more likely to result in 
coerced religious beliefs."222 In the elementary school context of Ball, the 
Court found mixing public school classes with parochial school classes, in the 
parochial school, to be a symbol of state endorsement and an encouragement 
of the religious beliefs taught in the school. 223 
217. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985). 
218. Id. at 389. 
219. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The "endorsement 
test" was later relied upon by a majority of the Court in another holiday display case. County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94, 598-602 (1989). However, Justice Kennedy-joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia-rejected the endorsement test in his separate 
opinion in that case. [d. at 668-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). See James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test 
as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671 (1990). 
220. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 624-27 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); Wallace v. Jai'free, 472 U.S. 38, 67-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
221. Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. The Court shows the greatest concern with Establishment Clause issues 
when children are involved. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657-58 (1992) ("[T]here are 
heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the 
elementary and secondary public schools'). ' 
222. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
223. Ball, 473 U.S. at 391-92. 
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4. Application of the Ball Analysis to Child Care 
Under existing precedents, it is this three-part analytical framework that 
should be applied to determine whether it is constitutionally permissible to 
award CCDBG grant and contract aid to nonsectarian but religiously affiliated 
child care programs. To apply the framework to the receipt of aid by such 
programs, one must understand what eligible child care programs actually 
look like and how they operate. The following two programs, one real and one 
hypothetical, illustrate the two principal types of sponsoring sectarian 
organizations with which child care programs are affiliated: churches and 
parochial schools. They also illustrate two extremes with respect to the 
different degrees of connection that may exist between a nonsectarian program 
and its sponsoring sectarian organization.224 The first program, a child care 
center housed in a church, is typical of programs that have minimal 
administrative and 'programmatic contacts with their sponsoring organizations. 
The second, a hypothetical program, is a child care center run by a parochial 
school and is as closely tied to its sponsoring organization as the CCDBG 
grant and contract provisions permit.225 
Woodside Child Care Center ("Woodside") 
This after-school program located in the Woodside Methodist Church in Silver 
Spring, Maryland, has nondiscriminatory admission and employment practices and 
includes no sectarian activities. The center reports to the board of the church. It 
is considered part of the church for tax purposes and takes advantage of the 
church's tax-exempt status. However, it is administered by a director who is not 
affiliated with the church and who is supervised by a parent board. It makes an 
occupancy payment to the church that is calculated to cover the church's costs. 
Fewer than five of the approximately one hundred children enrolled in the after-
school program attend the church.226 The church views its arrangement with the 
center as part of its social mission to serve the community in which it is located. 
Hypothetical Program 
This program offers preschool and before- and after-school care. It is 
administered by and housed in the same building as a pervasively sectarian 
parochial school, which has developed the child care program in response to 
perceived community needs. The program is planned as a secular one, with no 
religious purpose or activities, so that it may receive grants from or contract with 
the state agency administering CCDBG monies. Twenty-five percent of the places 
224. Although infonnation is limited and imperfect, there is undoubtedly a wide range of 
administrative and programmatic arrangements between nonsectarian programs and their sectarian 
sponsors. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes-75, 83 and accompanying text; infra note 253 and accompanying text. It should 
be remembered that the data in those notes show that religiously affiliated but non-sectarian child care 
programs such as these two account for a distinct minority of child care places. The congressional 
debates over the CCDBG assumed that all religiously affiliated programs probably account for fewer 
than one-third of center-based providers, which in turn represent roughly only about one-third of child 
care services used by families and funded under the statute. Supra note 26. 
226. Telephone Interview with Pam Yarrington, Director, Woodside Child Care Center (Oct. 28, 
1991). 
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in the program are made available to children funded under CCDBG grants or 
contracts. These children are admitted to the CCDBG-funded slots on a nondis-
criminatory, first-come, first-served basis, as required by the statute.227 In filling 
the other places, preference is given to children who themselves attend or whose 
siblings attend the parochial school, in accordance with the CCDBG provision that 
a preference may not be prohibited when a child or a child's family members 
"participate on a regular basis in other activities of the organization that owns or 
operates such provider."228 
In hiring staff to work with the children, priority is given to employees of the 
school and to the family members of employees of the school, which itself can 
legally discriminate in hiring on the basis of religion.229 A religious preference 
is used in hiring the administrative director, who does not work directly with the 
children and who reports to the principal of the parochial school. Approximately 
80% of the children and of the staff who work directly with them are members of 
the denomination with which the school is affiliated. Also, approximately 75% of 
the children and of the staff who work with them attend or are employed by the 
school. 
In applying the Court's three-part framework to determine the constitution-
ality of grant and contract aid to religiously affiliated programs such as those 
described above, the first question is whether the aid has a "primary effect" 
of advancing religion. The after-school classes at issue in Ball, which were 
provided almost exclusively at parochial schools, were found to have a 
"primary effect" of advancing religion because of the substantial way, in which 
they benefited the parochial schools' regular educational programs, programs 
that the Court considered to be inseparable from the schools' religious 
purposes.230 Because of the close connections between the schools' secular 
and religious educational functions, and between the after-school classes and 
the schools' regular educational activities, there was no way to guarantee that 
the public aid benefited only secular functions of the parochial schools.231 
The CCDBG aid, like the provision of after-school classes rejected in Ball, 
clearly benefits sectarian organizations. As in the cases of Woodside Center 
and the hypothetical program, the aid may help sponsoring organizations 
fulfill a social mission of service to the community. And, especially in cases 
like that of the hypothetical program, it may also enhance the sponsoring 
organizations' ability to attract and retain participants in its regular activities. 
If child care is characterized by the courts as a pure social service rather 
than an educational one, then any benefits to sectarian organizations conferred 
227. 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(2)(A). 
228.Id. § 98581(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
229. Id. § 98581(a)(3)(B). This section allows an organization to hire a qualified person "who is 
already participating on a regular basis in other activities of the organization that owns or operates" the 
child care provider instead of another qualified individual who does not participate in the organization. 
Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute prohibits a private organization from discriminating on 
the basis of religion. Title VII specifically exempts religiollS organizations' employment of individuals 
of a particular religion from the statute's anti-discrimination provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988); 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the exemption). 
230. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 n.12, 394-96 (1985). For discllSsion of this 
case, see supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text. 
231. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 394-96. 
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by CCDBG aid probably do not render the aid unconstitutional. The Court has 
taken a very different view of social services under the Establishment Clause. 
In the parochial school context, the Court has sanctioned the provision of 
government-funded social services to children in parochial schools because 
such services have been viewed as entirely distinct from the schools' sectarian 
educational purposes and activities. The Court has maintained that "general 
welfare services for children ... may be provided by the State regardless of 
the incidental benefit that accrues to church-related schools."232 Thus, the 
Court has found that the government's provision of health care services such 
as diagnostic speech and hearing services to parochial students on parochial 
school premises does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.233 
And in Zobrest, the Court intimated that the provision of a sign language 
interpreter could be equated with the permissible provision of such servic-
es.234 
The Establishment Clause does not per se bar religiously affiliated 
institutions from receiving grants to provide social services to the public.23S 
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court noted that it "ha[s] never held that religious 
institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly 
sponsored social welfare programs."236 The opinion referred to "the long 
history of cooperation and interdependency between governments and 
charitable or religious organizations" and cited a statement in a congressional 
report that "[ c ]haritable organizations with religious affiliations historically 
232. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 243 (1977) (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 
n.21 (1975». 
233. In Wolman, the Court stated: 
This Court's decisions contain a cornmon thread to the effect that the provision of health 
services to al\ schoolchildren-public and nonpublic-does not have the primary effect of 
aiding religion. . . . The Court in Meek explicitly stated, however, that the provision of 
diagnostic speech and hearing services by Pennsylvania seemed "to fall within that class of 
general welfare services for children that may be provided by the State regardless of the 
incidental benefit that accrues to church-related schools." 
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 242-44 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 n.21). The first ground upon which the 
Court distinguished the diagnostic· services from impermissible aid was that such services, "unlike 
teaching or counseling, have little or no educational content and are not closely associated with the 
educational mission of the nonpublic school." ld. at 244. The second ground, which would not be 
applicable to child care services in any event, was that "the diagnostician has only limited contact with 
the child ..•. The nature of the relationship between the diagnostician and the pupil does not provide 
the same opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views as attends the relationship between teacher 
and student or that between counselor and student." ld. 
234. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dis!., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2462 (1993) (In characterizing the aid 
as a "neutral service," the Court cited Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244). In a footnote supporting the assertion 
that there is no absolute bar to placing public employees in parochial schools, the Court says Wolman 
"made clear that 'the provision of health services to all schoolchildren-public and nonpublic-does not 
have the primary effect of aiding religion,' even when those services are provided within sectarian 
schools." ld. at 2469 (citing Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244). 
235. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (holding 
that government may fund the provision of medical services for the poor by a religious hospital). These 
cases are discussed in Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of Religiously Based Social Services: The 
First Amendment Considerations, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343, 367-72 (1992). 
236. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609. This passage was also quoted in Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466. 
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have provided social services with the support of their communities and 
without controversy."237 
One could argue that child care is more of a custodial service than an 
educational enterprise, particularly child care for infants and before- and after-
school care for school-age children when such care is restricted to recreational 
activities and supervisory functions. But the history of the CCDBG and of 
preschool programs in this country reveal a widely held view that child care, 
like elementary and secondary education, is linked to the social, emotional, 
and intellectual development of children.238 Under the CCDBG, all child 
care programs, except before- and after-school ones, are denominated as 
"early childhood development programs," which are characterized in the 
statute as "services that are not intended to serve as a substitute for a 
compulsory academic program[] but that are intended to provide an environ-
ment that enhances the educational, social, cultural, emotional, and recreation-
al development of children."239 Earlier versions of the legislation explicitly 
associated improvements in the quality of all child care, a goal of the 
CCDBG,240 with "strengthen[ing] our society by providing young children 
with the foundation on which to learn the basic skills necessary to be 
productive workers."241 
These visions of and hopes for child care have informed a national 
movement for preschool education, which has led to dramatic increases in 
recent years in preschool attendance by American children.242 Of the 
national education goals adopted by the nation's governors and the President 
at the beginning of this decade, the first goal is that all children begin school 
ready to learn, and the first objective under that goal is that "[a]ll disadvan-
taged and disabled children will have access to high quality and developmen-
tally appropriate preschool programs that help prepare children for 
school. "243 The publicly funded Head Start program for disadvantaged 
children, which was recently expanded by Congress in an effort to reach all 
eligible children,244 is founded in part on the notion that educational services 
237. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609. 
238. See infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the question of whether day 
care is a social service or a form of education, see Tobin, supra note 39, at 334-37. 
239.42 U.S.C. § 9858f(b)(1). 
240. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 964, supra note 38, at 669. "The purpose of this block grant program is 
to increase the availability, affordability, and quality of child care." ld. 
241. S. 1885, supra note 43, § 2(a)(3); see also H.R. 3660, supra note 43 § 2(a)(3) (containing the 
same language). 
242. Statistics suggest that: 
families are enrolling their children in educational programs prior to school entry at an 
increasingly early age regardless of maternal employment. For example, in 1965, only 16% of 
4-year-olds and 5% of 3-year-olds attended any type of preschool program. By 1989, 
enrollment had increased to just over half (51 %) of all 4-year-olds and 27% of all 3-year-olds 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991). 
WILLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 2. 
243. THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1991, supra note 8, at 37; see John E. Yang, Bush Unveils 
Education Plan, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1991, at AI. 
244. The Augustus F. Hawkins Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1990, P.L. 101-501, 104 Stat. 
1222 (1990). 
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for three- and four-year-olds can create a foundation for successful school 
careers.24S Similarly, one purpose of sectarian child care programs is to 
provide young children with religious education.246 
Courts should consider child care services as sharing significant characteris-
tics with educational ones, although they also share characteristics of social 
services: Because they are partly educational in nature, one cannot successful-
ly argue that the CCDBG grant and contract aid does not advance religion on 
the grounds that the child care that it funds is purely a social service. 
Even if child care is characterized as an educational service, however, the 
CCDBG passes constitutional muster: it does not directly promote religion by 
"providing a subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institution[] 
•••• "247 The benefits it confers can be distinguished from the benefits 
inherent in programs such as the Community Education plan, both because the 
CCDBG-funded services are separate and distinct from the organizations' 
regular activities, and because CCDBG aid is disbursed in a wholly different 
context, one in which only a minority of benefited programs are closely 
affiliated with sectarian organizations.248 
Unlike the after-school classes in Ball, the child care services eligible for 
CCDBG grant and contract aid do not directly support the regular activities 
of sponsoring sectarian organizations. Child care programs like those 
described above offer a service that is not provided as part of regular school-
day programs; child care programs eligible for grant and contract aid do not 
duplicate the regular sectarian activities of churches or other religious 
sponsoring organizations; and child care made available by sectarian sponsors 
is generally provided as a separate program on a fee-for-service basis to 
interested families.249 
245. The current version of the Head Start statute refers in its statement of purpose and policy to the 
role that the program "has played in the effective delivery of comprehensive health, educational, 
nutritional, social, and other services to economically disadvantaged children and their families." 42 
U.S.C. § 9831(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Recounting the beginnings of Head Start, Emily D. Cahan 
explains: "Early compensatory education seemed once again to promise to break the cycle of 
poverty .... Efforts to improve the poor child's physical health as well as to foster cognitive, social, 
and emotional development led to programs that combined medical and psychological services with 
educational enrichment." EMILY D. CAHAN, PAST CARING: A HISTORY OF U.S. PRESCHOOL CARE AND 
EDUCATION FOR THE POOR, 1820-1965, at 45 (National Center for Children in Poverty 1989). "The 
stated goal of Head Start is to provide economically disadvantaged children with an early socialization 
and education experience that will prepare them to begin elementary school on an equal footing with 
their more economically advantaged peers." AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 7, at 167. 
246. A National Council of Churches study notes: "A nursery school or child day care program with 
an explicit religious education component may be part of the mission undertaken by a parish. When this 
is the motivation, spiritual development will be central to the program." LINDNER ET AL., supra note 
27, at 20. 
247. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 388 (1985). 
248. See supra notes 22, 26-27 and accompanying text. 
249. In the National Council of Churches study, for example, "responses to the initial questionnaire 
indicated that 99% of all programs were open to all members of the community ...• In short, the vast 
majority of church-housed child day care programs can be viewed as programs for the community, 
whether operated by a church or only based in church property." LINDNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 26. 
In a study of Catholic elementary school financing, average fees for after-school care were found to 
range from one to six dollars per hour. ROBERT J. KEALEY, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY 
SCHOOLS & THEIR FINANCES 22 (1989). 
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Also, unlike Grand Rapid's Community Education program and other 
invalidated assistance,25o the CCDBG includes guarantees that there will be 
a separation in the parochial school setting between funded child care services 
and a school's regular educational programs that are part of its sectarian 
mission. The statute specifies that funds for before- and after-school services 
for children in grades one through twelve may not be used by programs like 
that of the hypothetical child care center for "any services provided ... 
during the regular school day," "any services for which ... students receive 
academic credit toward graduation," or "any instructional services which 
supplant or duplicate the academic program of any public or private 
school."25J These specific prohibitions, combined with the general prohibi-
tion against the use of grant and contract funds for sectarian activities, supply 
what the Court has indicated can be a crucial ingredient in constitutionally 
acceptable direct school aid plans. They constitute a strenuous effort to 
guarantee a separation between secular functions funded by the state and 
religious educational functions.2S2 When child care services are available on 
the premises of churches or other sectarian sponsors, rather than in parochial 
schools, they are likely to be even more separate from the sponsoring 
organizations' other programs. 
Finally, only a minority of child care programs that receive CCDBG grant 
and contract aid will be religiously affiliated. Among these, an even smaller 
number will be as closely integrated with the sponsoring sectarian organiza-
tion as the hypothetical child care center. Many religiously affiliated child 
care programs, like Woodside Child Care Center, will not share staff with 
their sponsors, serve the same families as the sponsoring organization, or be 
administratively controlled by the sponsor.253 By contrast, in Ball, as in the 
cases of all the private school aid plans found unacceptable by the Court, the 
vast majority of recipients of aid were pervasively sectarian.254 The CCDBG 
250. Ball, 473 U.S. at 387; see also infra note 252 and cases cited supra notes 184-90. 
251. 42 U.S.C. § 9858k(b). Funds for preschool programs are not SUbjected to such restrictions, but 
by definition they are not duplicative of regular elementary school programs. 
252. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 614-15 (1988) ("[I]fthere were such a provision 
[preventing the use of federal funds for religious purposes], it would be easier to conclude that the 
statute on its face could not be said to have the primary effect of advancing religion ••• .'); Wolman 
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,251 (1977) (holding the program invalid because there "has been no endeavor 
'to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State 
financial aid supports only the former."~; Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 
U.S. 472, 480 (1973) ("[N]o attempt is made under the statute, and no means are available, to assure 
that internally prepared tests are free of religious instruction.'); cj Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993) (sign-language interpreter ''will neither add to nor subtract from that 
environment, and hence the provision of such assistance is not barred by the Establishment Clause'). 
253. See LINDNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 26,52,60. In this study: 
56% of centers responding to the follow-up questionnaire are church-operated. In spite of this 
fact, only 28% of centers are directly subject to the policy decisions of church boards, at least 
from the perspective of center directors, which suggests that even church-operated centers are 
not tightly controlled by the church. Parents of children enrolled in the center are far more 
likely (54%) than church boards (28%) to play some formal role in program policy making. 
ld. at 60; see supra notes 26-27, 224 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra note 39. 
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does not operate to subsidize a class of beneficiaries that is primarily 
sectarian. 
The second question in applying Ball's three-part framework to the 
provision of grant and contract aid to religiously affiliated but nonsectarian 
child care is whether this aid creates a substantial risk of government-funded 
religious indoctrination. Such a risk was present in Ball because the after-
school program in effect replicated the circumstances of the regular school 
program, in that parochial schoolteachers provided educational services to 
parochial school students on parochial school premises.2SS In the parochial 
schools' regular programs, teachers and students worked together to achieve 
religious goals, and the Court feared that the religious message would spill 
over into the after-school program.256 Even when a teacher attempts in good 
faith to avoid inculcation, the danger arises because "the pressures of the 
environment" might undermine the teacher's efforts.257 As the Lemon Court 
was aware, "the process of inculcating religious doctrine is, of course, 
enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in primary schools 
particularly,"258 which children attend from approximately the age of five 
or six to the age of ten or eleven. 
The issue of whether government aid poses a substantial risk of govern-
ment-funded inculcation of religion arises only in certain types of religiously 
affiliated programs eligible for CCDBG aid. Programs such as Woodside 
Center that are housed by, but not closely linked, administratively or 
programmatically, with a sponsoring church pose no real danger of govern-
ment-funded religious inculcation. The children and the child care workers are 
not primarily adherents of the sponsoring organization's denomination, and 
they are not engaged together in sectarian activities at other times. At the 
other end of the spectrum, however, in programs like t~e hypothetical one, the 
issue does arise, at least with respect to its before- and after-school child care. 
With respect to the preschool portion of the hypothetical program, by 
definition there can be no overlap of students and, as a practical matter, few 
preschool staff members are likely to work in the regular school because the 
preschool operates at the same time as the regular school program. In 
addition, the preschool students, most of whom are younger than five years 
of age, are arguably less impressionable than children in the primary grades 
because the preschoolers are less likely to understand, absorb, and retain 
255. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
In the course of an entanglement analysis in Lemon, the Court emphasized the particular risks 
inherent in supplementing salaries of instructors who teach secular subjects in parochial school 
environments. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617-19 (1971). The Court wrote: 
We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his 
or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in 
remaining religiously neutral. Doctrines and faith are not inculcated or advanced by neutrals. 
With the best of intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a total separation between 
secular teaching and religious doctrine. 
ld. at 618-19. 
256. Ball, 473 U.S. at 387. 
257.ld. (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977». 
258. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616. 
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religious influences.2S9 The hypothetical program's before- and after-school 
services, however, create a situation that is undeniably similar to Grand 
Rapid's Community Education program. These parts of the hypothetical 
program are composed primarily of impressionable primary grade parochial 
school students and employees of the parochial school, who are engaged 
together in religious educational endeavors during the regular school day.260 
Despite the considerable risk posed by these parts of the hypothetical 
program, they are less constitutionally threatening than programs invalidated 
by the Court because they differ from the invalidated programs in the 
significant ways discussed above.261 The fact that the child care workers 
provide a type of service that is not offered during the regular school day 
should facilitate any transitions that they must make from religious educators 
to nonsectarian child care workers. Programs that are so closely tied to their 
sectarian sponsor also represent a minority of religiously affiliated nonsectari-
an providers, and religiously affiliated providers represent a minority of 
center-based providers.262 Thus, because CCDBG grant and contract aid 
does not operate in the context of a largely religious system, it poses radically 
less danger of government-funded inculcation of religion than do the 
invalidated aid programs, which have disbursed public funds to private school 
systems dominated by religious institutions.263 Moreover, Congress has 
taken deliberate steps to reduce the danger of inculcation by prohibiting all 
but limited forms of religious discrimination in the admission of children and 
the employment of staff members who work directly with them.264 
Finally, the CCDBG has an important, inherent safeguard against the risk 
of government-funded inculcation of religion. Unlike the private school aid 
schemes rejected by the Court, the statute creates a disincentive for programs 
operated by sectarian sponsors to apply for grant and contract aid. All child 
care programs, including sectarian programs, are eligible to redeem parent-
held child care certificates. Inasmuch as these certificates may be used for 
sectarian care,26S sectarian organizations that own or· operate child care 
programs do not have to choose between fulfilling their religious purposes and 
receiving CCDBG financial assistance. They are not forced to compromise 
their religious missions in order to benefit from the CCDBG. 
259. Cf Tobin, supra note 39 (discussing whether very young children could perceive or be affected 
by a symbolic link between government and religion). 
[I]t is difficult to believe that significant numbers of children of preschool age would be 
sufficiently sophisticated to (1) know and understand that their day care arrangements were 
partially funded by a government certificate, and (2) to form a conceptual "symbolic link" 
between religion and government as a consequence of that awareness. 
ld. at 334. 
260. See the discussion of Ball, 473 U.S. 373, supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra notes 248-52, 254 and accompanying text. One recent study estimated that only 3% 
of child care centers for children younger than six that are sponsored by religious organizations are 
sponsored by parochial achools. KISKER ET AL., supra note 26, at 33. 
262. See supra notes 26-27, 75, 83, 224, 253 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 92, 97, 99-111 and accompanying text. 
265. For discussion of the constitutionality of these vouchers, see infra part III.C. 
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The last question the Court has posed in exammmg whether aid to 
religiously affiliated institutions has a primary effect of advancing religion is 
whether an impermissible symbolic link is created between government and 
religion. Obviously, whenever a public benefit is provided to any religiously 
affiliated activity, some link is established between the government and 
religion, from which some endorsement of religion could be inferred. The 
mere fact that a link exists, and that an inference of endorsement could be 
made, however, does not invalidate public assistance. Ifit did, no government 
aid to religiously affiliated organizations would be constitutional. The point 
at which the link becomes impermissible is a matter of degree. 
In Ball, the Court found an impermissible link because the challenged 
programs established what was essentially a government enterprise located on 
the premises of pervasively sectarian elementary schools, a government 
enterprise conducted by and for participants in the pervasively sectarian 
schools' sectarian activities.266 The programs took "place in the same 
religious school building and [were] largely composed of students who [were] 
... adherents of the same denomination."267 "In this environment, the 
students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference between the 
religious school classes and the 'public school' classes .... "268 As in all 
Establishment Clause cases,269 the Court's concern was heightened by the 
age of the affected children: "The symbolism of a union between church and 
state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is 
limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as 
much as of free and voluntary choice."27o 
CCDBG grant and contract aid distributed to religiously affiliated programs 
does not inject a government program into a sectarian environment; it simply 
subsidizes the tuition of income-eligible children attending private programs. 
Additionally, as argued above,271 the subsidized child care services are 
separate and distinct from the religious activities of sponsoring organizations 
to a greater degree than were the after-school classes in Ball-a fact that 
further reduces the possibility that the children will perceive government 
endorsement of the sponsoring organizations' religious creeds. 
266. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 376-79, 389-92 (1985). Ball is the first case 
involving aid to religious institutions in which the Court imported the notion of an impennissible 
symbolic link and found such a link. In Bowen, the Court rejected the trial court's finding of such a link 
in the distribution of AFLA funds to religious institutions. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613-14 
(1988). 
267. Ball, 473 U.S. at 391. 
268.Id. 
269. See. e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992) (discussing "heightened concerns with 
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public 
schools"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (stating that the "Court has been 
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and 
secondary schools'); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (plurality opinion) (stating that 
"college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination'); see also supra 
notes 220 and 258-59. 
270. Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. 
271. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. 
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Because only a minority of recipients of CCOBG grant and contract aid will 
be religiously affiliated, there is little risk that the aid will be perceived by the 
public as an endorsement of religion. Furthermore, any possible risk is 
lessened by the restrictions imposed on religious discrimination in admissions 
and employment. Although the restrictions allow for a limited degree of 
religious discrimination, the symbolic effect of this discrimination is mitigated 
by the fact that the rule imposes a facially neutral criterion that gives 
religious organizations the same right to prefer their own members that 
secular sponsoring organizations already enjoy.272 When the risk of a 
symbolic link is greatest-when a private program in the judgment of 
Congress acquires public characteristics because 80% or more of its budget 
is derived from public sources-then religious discrimination is prohibited 
in the admission of all children and in the employment of staff members who 
work directly with them.273 
The CCOBG grant and contract aid provisions do not have a primary effect 
of advancing religion, do not create a substantial risk that government funds 
will be used for the inculcation of religion, and do not create a symbolic link 
between government and religion. 
C. The Constitutionality of the Statute's Voucher Mechanism 
The CCOBG voucher system raises substantial Establishment Clause 
concerns because it allows parents to use child care certificates to purchase 
secular and sectarian services from religiously affiliated providers. Such a use 
of public funds for sectarian services is similar to impermissible direct aid 
programs because it involves a public, unrestricted transfer of government 
re.venues to sectarian institutions. As discussed above, the Establishment 
Clause prohibits general, unrestricted public subsidization of pervasively 
sectarian institutions because such subsidization amounts to government 
financing of religion.274 
On the other hand, the voucher scheme is similar to permissible tax 
provisions that assist families with parochial school expenses because it 
distributes benefits neutrally between sectarian and nonsectarian institutions, 
and when its benefits flow to religious institutions, they do so as a result of 
the free choices of individual families rather than as a result of any govern-
mental action. Constitutionally acceptable tax measures, like direct aid plans, 
do economically benefit sectarian institutions. As the Court has observed, 
"financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has an economic effect 
comparable to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their 
children."275 Social and political experience, however, rather than economic 
logic, has led the Court to accept tax relief that benefits sectarian institutions. 
272. See supra notes 83-84, 115 and accompanying text 
273. See supra notes 85, 112-14 and accompanying text. 
274. For discussion of the impermissibility of direct, unrestricted financial aid, see supra notes 129-
35 and accompanying text. 
275. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,399 (1983). 
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Under the Court's jurisprudence, tax relief is permissible when it neutrally 
benefits sectarian and nonsectarian institutions.276 Thus, religious institutions 
may benefit indirectly from tax relief afforded an individual if the tax relief 
neutrally subsidizes both sectarian and nonsectarian activities. The Court has 
treated tax· aid, which institutions and individuals avail themselves of 
privately, as formally and symbolically consistent with the principle that the 
state itself must not finance religious activity or otherwise endorse religion. 
No collected tax revenues-no public funds-are transferred from the 
government to religious institutions through tax relief.277 The government 
instead forgoes revenues that it would otherwise have collected. 
In Walz v. Tax Commission278 the Court upheld a law granting a property 
tax exemption for a class of nonprofit organizations that included church-
es.279 The Court reasoned that a tax exemption, as opposed to a direct 
money subsidy, did not advance religion; it is "not sponsorship since the 
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply 
abstains from demanding that the church support the state."280 In contradis-
tinction to grant programs, tax exemptions create only a minimal involvement 
between church and state. By restricting their "fiscal relationship," tax 
programs "tend[] to complement and reinforce the desired separation 
.... "281 The Court also noted that such exemptions predate the Constitu-
tion282 and in practice have not "given the remotest sign of leading to an 
established church or religion and on the contrary . .. [have] operated 
affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious 
belief. "283 
The exemption at issue in Walz did "not single[] out one particular church 
or religious group or even churches as such ... ,"284 but in Texas Monthly 
v. Bullock, Inc.,28s the Court invalidated an exemption from sales and use 
taxes that was targeted specifically at periodicals distributed by a religious 
faith.286 Although there was no majority opinion, a majority of justices 
agreed that a statute lacks a secular purpose when it singles out religious 
literature for preferential treatment.287 In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. 
Board of Equalization/88 by contrast, the Court unanimously held there was 
276. See infra notes 278-87 and accompanying text. 
277. The only exception would arise in the case of a refundable tax credit, under which collected tax 
revenues are distributed to the person claiming the credit. 1 STAND. FED. TAX REp. (CCH), vol. 1, 'II 
4082 (1993). 
278. Walz, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
279. [d. 
280. [d. at 675. 
281. [d. at 676. 
282. [d. at 676-77. 
283. [d. at 678. 
284. [d. at 673. 
285. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
286. [d. 
287. [d. For a discussion of the implications of this ruling, see Wendy G. Shaller, Churches and 
Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. Pm. L. REv. 345, 359-64 (1990). 
288. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
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no excessive entanglement between government and religion when California 
applied a generally applicable sales tax to religious materials sold by a 
religious organization.289 
The Court has relied on similar logic to approve tax schemes that subsidize 
families' school expenses, including expenses related to parochial school 
attendance. In Mueller v. Allen/90 the Court upheld a tax deduction for 
tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses that was available to all 
families. The law's challengers argued that the tax provision impermissibly 
advanced religion because it primarily benefited sectarian education. The 
expenses incurred by parents of public school students were negligible, and 
almost all of the children in private school attended religiously affiliated 
institutions.291 The Court found that the tax deduction had a secular purpose 
and that it did not advance religion because it was only one among many 
deductions allowed by the state legislature and because it was neutrally 
available to all parents for all public and private school expenses.292 Thus, 
it did not "confer any imprimatur" of state approval upon sectarian educa-
tion.293 Similarly, the fact that "public funds become available only as a 
result of numerous private choices"294 was seen as a factor that mitigated 
against the possibility of any constitutionally impermissible imprimatur. The 
289. [d. at 395-97 (finding that the statute does not require state involvement in organization's day-
to-day activities or require state inquiry regarding religious content of materials or motive in selling 
them). 
290. Mueller, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). Initially the Court took a more restrictive view. In Committee 
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the Court invalidated a New York 
law that benefited parents at certain income levels whose children attended private elementary and 
secondary schools, 85% of which were religiously affiliated. [d. at 768. The law allowed parents to 
deduct a specified amount from their gross income. [d. at 765-67. The Court held that a tax benefit for 
parents who send their children to sectarian schools had the "purpose and inevitable effect" of aiding 
and advancing religion, and unlike the tax exemption for churches approved in Walz, providing the 
benefit would tend to "increase rather than limit the involvement between Church and State." [d. at 793. 
The Court's majority also emphasized that no historical precedent existed for the tax relief program, 
unlike the traditional tax provision at issue in Walz. [d. at 792. Although the Court in Mueller strove 
to reconcile its decision with Nyquist, it appears that the Court abandoned the approach it had taken 
in the earlier case. 
291. Of the children in Minnesota attending private elementary and secondary schools, "about 95% 
of these students attended schools considering themselves to be sectarian." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391. 
The Court rejected the idea that it should examine whether or not the tax in effect primarily benefited 
religious institutions: 
We need not consider these contentions in detail. We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding 
the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which 
various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law. Such an approach would 
scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled 
standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated. Moreover, the fact that private 
persons fail in a particular year to claim the tax relief to which they are entitled-under a 
facially neutral statute-should be of little importance in determining the constitutionality of 
the statute permitting such relief. 
[d. at 401. 
292. [d. at 396-99 (citation omitted). The Court emphasized also that its "decisions consistently have 
recognized that traditionally '[I]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and 
distinctions in tax statutes.''' [d. at 396 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 
U.S. 540, 547 (1983). 
293. [d. at 397 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981}). 
294. [d. at 399. 
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Court stressed the social desirability of private, and specifically of parochial, 
schools on the grounds that they relieve public school systems of a financial 
burden and offer educational alternatives to, and useful competition with, 
public schools.29s Under this reasoning, of course, the federal tax relief for 
child care expenses that benefits families with children in sectarian pro-
grams296 is also constitutional. 
Mueller left open the question of whether its reasons for upholding tax 
relief would also validate voucher schemes in which individuals are permitted 
to redeem vouchers for 'sectarian services. Under voucher schemes, unlike tax 
relief plans, the government directly transfers collected revenues to religious 
institutions that have accepted government-issued vouchers. The Court came 
the closest to addressing this question in Witters v. Washington Department 
of Services for the Blind.297 In Witters a visually impaired man sought state 
vocational training funds to pay his tuition at a Christian college, where he 
was preparing for a religious career.298 The Court approved this use, in a 
nearly unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall, which reasoned that the aid 
was permissible because it would support religious activities only through the 
truly private and independent decisions of individuals.299 But Justice 
Marshall also stressed that the program was not one of the "ingenious" plans 
periodically before the Court for providing state funds to sectarian schools, 
that it did not tend to afford greater benefits to recipients enrolled in religious 
education programs, and that, "importantly," it would not lead to any 
significant portion of aid flowing to religious education.30o In addition, there 
was no evidence of any other application for funds for religious studies.30) 
Thus, the Court's opinion suggests that a voucher scheme would be unconsti-
tutional if a majority of, or probably even if a significant portion of, the aid 
it made available to individuals was used to underwrite religious activities. 
The Court's suggestion is a desirable one. Voucher systems should be 
treated differently than tax measures because they convey a greater endorse-
ment of religion. Voucher plans publicly transfer collected government 
revenues to religious institutions. Under a voucher plan, (l) parents present 
government-issued documents in full or partial payment for tuition to sectarian 
programs, which could comprise a significant minority or perhaps even a 
majority of private programs in a particular community, and (2) the programs 
then exchange the documents for direct cash payments from the government. 
Tax plans, on the other hand, are supported by tradition302 and merely 
295. [d. at 40 \-02. The Court is also likely to see utility in the largely private child care system, 
including its religiously affiliated sector. 
296. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
297. Witters, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
298. [d. at 482-83, 487. 
299. [d. at 487 (eight justices joined in entire opinion, Justice O'Connor joined in parts I and 111). 
300. [d. at 488. 
301. [d. 
302. See generally supra notes 282-83, 90 and accompanying text; Conkle, supra note 193, at 1186 
("Tax exemptions for religious organizations . . . involve only indirect financial assistance and are 
supported by a tradition that predates our national founding and that extends to all comers of American 
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permit individuals to retain money that would otherwise be paid to the 
government. They operate by means of a private and confidential system of 
forms completed by individuals in their homes for processing by the 
government behind closed doors. Thus, vouchers, unlike tax assistance, 
publicly connect church and state, symbolically and administratively, in a way 
that is more akin to direct government aid than to neutrally available tax 
benefits. 
The CCDBG's child certificate scheme violates the Establishment Clause 
because it publicly transfers government funds directly to religious institu-
tions. Even if allowing the use of parent-negotiated certificates for sectarian 
care institutions does not appear to a "reasonable observer" as the government 
"endorsing a religious practice or belief,"303 it puts a state imprimatur on 
religious activities. However, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 
suggests that today's Court is likely to approve the use of child care 
certificates for sectarian services.304 In a footnote in Zobrest, the Court 
government'). 
303. Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
304. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 113 S.· Ct 2462 (1993); see Tobin, supra note 39 
(arguing that the vouchers are constitutional under existing precedents). But see Boothby, supra note 
95 (arguing that child care vouchers are unconstitutional). . 
If the Court chooses to approve the CCDBG's vouchers for sectarian child care programs, it need not 
also approve vouchers for parochial elementary and secondary schools. The Court could rely on legally 
significant distinctions between the current child care system and the private elementary and secondary 
education system. By doing so, the Court would continue to uphold the symbolic importance of drawing 
a line between permissible and impermissible aid. 
Allowing the use of certificates for sectarian child care would be more in keeping with Establishment 
Clause doctrines and would cause less political divisiveness than allowing the use of vouchers for 
parochial elementary and secondary schools. First, most center-based child care, which accounts for only 
a part of available services, is not religiously affiliated, and among religiously affiliated centers, only 
a minority may actually offer sectarian programs, see supra notes 22, 26-27 and accompanying text, 
whereas in the parochial school aid cases, the Court has described situations in which the majority of 
private schools are sectarian. See supra note 39. In the latter settings, vouchers would primarily support 
pervasively sectarian institutions and would aid a core purpose of providing religious education 
throughout childhood. In the child care setting, a much smaller percentage of funds would flow to 
religious programs, and a significant portion of those funds would be paid to infant and preschool care 
programs, in which, given the tender age of the children, religious indoctrination may be both less 
relevant and less efficacious than it is in elementary and secondary parochial schools. See supra note 
259 and accompanying text. 
Secondly, child care certificates may have a less significant Establishment Clause effect because the 
vouchers would not be used in the context of, and would not affect, an existing, state-sponsored, 
universally available child care system. The certificates, redeemable at any registered family day care 
home or center-based facility, allow the parents who hold them a wide range of choices rather than 
giving them an opportunity to leave a pluralistic, nonsectarian, state-run school system in order to enter 
an alternate, primarily sectarian system. For both these sets of reasons, the child care certificates do not 
pose the same level of "political divisiveness" concerns that the Court has expressed in, and limited to, 
the area of government aid to parochial schools. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for 
discussion of political divisiveness. 
These distinctions between the effects of child care and school vouchers would make it possible to 
uphold the CCDBG device without either approvIDg all vouchers, or taking the further step of adopting 
a "nonpreferentialist" view that direct government aid to religion is permissible if it is supplied in a 
neutral fashion. The Court could approve the child care certificates on the ground that, in the context 
of our present child care landscape, they do not constitute either a government advancement, or 
endorsement, of religion. 
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noted that there could be no possible constitutional infirmity if funds were 
paid directly to parents who in turn hired the sign language interpreter for 
their son. "[R]espondent readily admits, as it must, that there would be no 
problem under the Establishment Clause if the IDEA funds instead went 
directly to James' parents .... "305 In the text of the opinion, the Zobrest 
majority, which included now-retired Justice White,306 vigorously endorsed 
Mueller and the "virtually identical reasoning" of Witters. 307 The Zobrest 
opinion stressed that the two key factors in both cases were (1) the general 
availability of aid, without regard to either the public or private or the 
sectarian or nonsectarian nature of the benefited institution, and (2) the fact 
that funds flowed to sectarian institutions only as a result of the private choice 
of an individual.308 
This characterization in Zobrest echoes the concurrences of Justice Powell 
and Justice O'Connor in Witters, which respectively rejected and de-empha-
sized the suggestion by Justice Marshall that the identity of the ultimate 
beneficiaries of aid is relevant.309 Instead, Justice Powell maintained that the 
critical factors supporting the decision in Witters were that benefits were 
equally available to parents of public and private school children and that 
"any benefit to religion resulted from the 'numerous private choices of 
individual parents of school-age children. ,"310 Justice O'Connor approved 
Justice Powell's analysis3\l and added, in the language of her endorsement 
test: "No reasonable observer is likely to draw from. the facts before us an 
inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief."312 
If the Court permits aU vouchers, the equation of vouchers with permissible tax assistance wiU 
represent an erosion of the rule that the government should not fund religion, and of the ideal that 
religious endeavors should be independent, private, and voluntarily funded. It would be preferable to 
either reject such use of vouchers, including child care certificates, or to permit only the use of child 
care certificates for sectarian services while maintaining limitations on vouchers in the elementary and 
secondary school context. 
305. Zobrest, \13 S. Ct. at 2469 n.ll. 
306. Justices Scalia, Keunedy, and Thomas, aU of whom had not participated in either Mueller or 
Witters, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White in the majority opinion. Id. at 2462. 
307.Id. at 2466-67. 
308.Id. 
309. In a footnote, Justice PoweU argues: 
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante at 488, this conclusion does not depend on the fact 
that petitioner appears to be the only handicapped stUdent who has sought to use his assistance 
to pursue religious training. Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller ultimately flowed to 
religious institutions. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.O at 401, with id.O, at 405 (Mai'shaU, 
J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the aid was thus channeled by individual parents and not by the 
State, making the tax deduction permissible under the "primary effect" test of Lemon. 
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 491 n.3 (1986). 
310. Witters, 474 U.S. at 491 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399). 
311. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote: 
As Justice PoweU's separate opinion persuasively argtles, the Court's opinion in Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), makes clear that 'state programs that are whoUy neutral in offering 
educational assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the second 
part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because any aid to religion results from the private 
decisions of beneficiaries.' Ante, at 490-91 (PoweU, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Witters, 474 U.S. at 493. 
312. Witters, 474 U.S. at 493. 
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Thus, a majority oftoday's Court may be prepared to extend the reasoning of 
Mueller to the use of vouchers to pay for sectarian child care. 
CONCLUSION 
Providing CCDBG grant and contract aid to religiously affiliated nonsectari-
an child care programs is constitutional under the Court's existing Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. With this form of aid available-as well as 
support through tax measures-federal, state, and local governments may 
provide substantial support for religiously affiliated child care programs 
without violating current Establishment Clause doctrines and the principles 
they embody. The CCDBG's use of vouchers for sectarian child care services, 
on the other hand, undermines Establishment Clause ideals by permitting 
direct government funding of sectarian activities. 
The status of the Court's precedents in the area of government aid to 
religious institutions is uncertain and unstable, especially given the changing 
composition of the Court.3\3 New law may emerge, permitting increased aid 
to such institutions and modifying constraints formerly established by the 
Court.314 In refashioning Establishment Clause principles for government aid 
j) 
313. With the departure of Justice Marshall from the Court in 1991, only three of the justices in the 
Ball majority remain. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). With Justice White's 
retirement this year, Chief Justice Rehnquist is the only remaining justice of the two who wanted to 
approve the. Ball Community Education program. ld. at 398-401; see infra notes 311-12 and 
accompanying text. 
314. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), the most recent aid-to-
religious-institutions case, the Court chose not to reject the Lemon test, although it did emphasize the 
reasoning of the Mueller and Witters cases rather than merely applying a straightforward Lemon 
analysis. Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), involving 
a church's request to show films in a public school facility, the Court's majority did not repudiate the 
Lemon test and noted that providing access for the church would not violate the test. ld. at 2148 n.7. 
In Establishment Clause cases that have not involved aid to religious institutions, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia have, in separate opinions, proffered alternative visions of 
the Establishment Clause. Recommending that the Lemon test be abandonee!, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
stated that he rejects the "wall of separation" ideal of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), 
in favor of the notion that the Establishment Clause prohibits only the designation of a national church 
or the assertion of a govemmental preference for one denomination over another. Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Also advocating the abandonment of Lemon, 
Justice Scalia-joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas-stated in dissent 
in Lee v. Weisman that the Establishment Clause was adopted to prohibit an establishment of religion 
at the federal level, an establishment that would require church attendance and impose civil disabilities 
on dissenters. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2683 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Lamb's Chapel, 
Justice Scalia, once again joined by Justice Thomas, said that giving the church access to the school 
facilities in that case would not violate the Establishment Clause "because it does not signify state or 
local embrace of a particular religious sect." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2151 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Justice Kennedy expounded his general theory of the Establishment Clause in the case of a public 
holiday display that included religious symbols. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White and Scalia, Justice Kennedy did not 
recommend abandoning the Lemon test but contended that the Court's precedents prohibit the 
govemment from (1) coercing anyone to support or participate in religion, or (2) giving such substantial 
benefits to religion that it establishes or tends to establish a state religion. ld. at 659 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (also rejecting the endorsement concept); see also Lamb's 
Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Read 
literally, this assertion, like Justice Scalia's implicit and Chief Justice Rehnquist's explicit rejection of 
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to religious institutions, however, it ,seems unlikely that the Court will retreat 
from the basic premise, affirmed in its two most recent cases in this area, that 
government funds should not be expended for religious goals and activities. 
In Zobrest, the Court distinguished the aid it upheld in that case from an 
impermissible direct cash subsidy to a religious school. 3lS Two of the 
dissenters pronounced: '''Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
characterized by few absolutes,' at a minimum 'the Clause does absolutely 
prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the 
beliefs of a particular religious faith.'''316 Earlier, in Bowen v. Kendrick,317 
the Court made it clear that the Establishment Clause would be violated if the 
federal aid in question was actually used to further religion.318 
the ''wall of separation" ideal, suggests a sweeping revision of the Court's current Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Justice Kennedy's assertion would affect the Court's 
basic premise that public funds may not ,be expended for religious activities, the premise accepted by 
all of these justices in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). If the "benefits to religion" do not 
include direct, "nonpreferential," and secularly motivated government funding of religious activities, 
then Justice Kennedy's assertion does not undermine the Court's premise, and lines must still be drawn 
between aid that directly funds religious observance and aid that indirectly benefits religion in other 
ways. Similarly, if the use of government funds for religious activities constitutes coercing taxpayers 
to support religion, then the Establishment Clause would continue to prohibit such use of public monies, 
and it would still be necessary to draw lines between permissible and impermissible aid. See Laycock, 
supra note 14, at 40 (observing that "it is cornmon ground that taxation is coercive"). 
For Justice Souter's exposition of his views that the Establishment Clause does apply to 
"governmental practices that do not favor one religion or denomination over others" and that "coercion 
of religious conformity, over and above state endorsement of religious exercise or belief," is not "a 
necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation," see Lee, 112 S. Cl at 2667-78 (Souter, J., 
concurring, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor). For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's views, 
see supra notes 219-20, 222 and accompanying text. 
In response to questioning in her Senate confirmation hearings about the criticisms of the Lemon test, 
Justice Ginsburg said: • 
Senator, I don't have a satisfactory alternative. I can't tell you-I think this is a very difficult, 
very difficult area. I can only say that I am open to arguments; to ideas. But at this moment, 
as I said yesterday, it's very easy to criticize. It's not so easy to offer an alternative. 
Capitol Hi11 Hearing, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
as Supreme Court Justice, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, July 21, 
1993, at 29. 
For recent scholarly commentary on general theories of the Establishment Clause, see, for example, 
Conkle, supra note 193; Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in 
Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841 (1992); Marshall, supra note 18; McConnell, Religious 
Participation in Public Programs, supra note 96. 
315. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2465-69. 
316. [d. at 2473 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.) (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at 385). 
317. Bowen, 487 U.S. 589. 
318. The opinion concluded by directing the trial court on remand to consider (1) whether aid "is 
flowing to grantees that can be considered 'pervasively sectarian' religious institutions, such as we have 
held parochial schools to be," and (2) whether "in particular cases ... aid has been used to fund 
'specifically religious activit[ies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting.''' [d. at 621 (citations 
omitted). 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in that case but wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia, 
to "discuss one feature of the proceedings on remand." [d. at 624. Kennedy wrote that when a 
government program distributes benefits neutrally among religious and non-religious applicants it is not 
unconstitutional merely because the statute allows payments to a pervasively sectarian institution for the 
provision of secular social services. He agreed, however, that if funds are actually being used to further 
religion, then the Establishment Clause has been violated. [d. at 624-25. 
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If the Court does not abandon this premise-which excludes the payment 
of direct, unrestricted aid to pervasively sectarian organizations-it will 
continue to draw a line between permissible and impermissible aid, even if it 
redraws its existing line in a way that allows more assistance, possibly even 
permitting types of plans that it has rejected in the past. If the Court instead 
rejects the premise that government should not fund religious activities, we 
will lose the constitutive exercise319 of debating and deciding upon the line 
between permissible and impermissible aid, the exercise fruitfully undertaken 
in the enactment of the CCDBG. Such action by the Court would be 
unfortunate because the line-drawing effort itself, wherever and however ably 
it ultimately marks the boundary, serves the purpose of publicly promoting the 
central Establishment Clause principle that a separation between the public 
sphere of government and the private sphere of religion is an important means 
of securing religious liberty. 
319. As scholar Hany H. Wellington observes, "[w]hat the Court decides is both derived from public 
values and in tum shapes public values. It is this interaction-this complex and robust dialogue-that 
ultimately makes the final meaning of our fundamental law ••.• " HARRy H. WELLINGTON, 
INTERPRETING TIlE CONSTITImON 158 (1990). 
